Foreign Broadcast Information Service
50
ANNIVERSARY
1941 - 1991

Daily Report

Supplement

Soviet Union

RSFSR Presidential Race

FBIS-SOV-91-104-S
Thursday
30 May 1991

Soviet Union
SUPPLEMENT
RSFSR Presidential Race

FBIS-SOV-91-104-S *30 May 1991*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

RSFSR Presidential Race

Candidates Answer Magazine's Queries *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 20]* 1
IZVESTIYA Views Candidates' Motives *[21 May]* 4
Radio Program Views Candidates *[Radio Rossii]* 6
Editor Comments on Candidates *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 24 May]* 7
Tuleyev's Presidential Candidacy Viewed *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 24 May]* 10
Ryzhkov Gives Election Address to Soldiers *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 May]* 10
Ryzhkov Interviewed *[Moscow TV]* 12
Makashov Interviewed on Motives of Candidacy *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 May]* 12
PRAVDA Interviews Makashov *[29 May]* 14
Bakatin Interviewed on Candidacy *[Moscow TV]* 16
Gromov Interviewed on Vice Presidential Candidacy *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 25 May]* 26

Candidates Answer Magazine's Queries

91UN1555A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 20, 22 May 91 pp 1, 2

[RSFSR presidential election candidates answer LITERATURNAYA GAZETA questions: "Who Is Worthy of Russia?"]

[Text] The first elections of a president of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] in history are scheduled for 12 June. Direct. On a multiparty basis. True, many parties which have nominated their candidates are not officially registered, and others may be called parties only very conditionally, but the spectrum of views, interests, and positions is very wide. As is the choice also: from an ex-prime minister through a representative of sexual minorities.

The LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editorial office put to each candidate four questions:

1. What qualities, in your view, should the president of Russia possess at this difficult moment in its history?

2. If you are elected, what will your first presidential ukase be?

3. Whom would you like to invite onto your presidential team?

4. What book would you recommend that your cabinet members read?

Vadim Bakatin, member of the USSR Security Council

1. He should be an individual personifying the conscience of multinational Russia. Tolerance, industriousness, decisiveness and resolve, responsibility, capacity for understanding and experiencing the people's mood and helping each individual.... I could continue, but this is sufficient to see the entire drama of the situation for each candidate for president of Russia.

2. Priorities are essential, and I have ordered them for myself also. But the "first ukase" would depend on the continuity and logic of preceding decisions.

3. Continuity is essential. If I am elected, I have no intention of driving anyone out in a trice and will work with the people who are already conversant with the situation. The main criteria are professionalism and decency.

4. Ivan Bunin's "Cursed Days." I am reading it now. And I would recommend that everyone read it.

Vladimir Voronin, chairman of the Center Bloc of Political Parties

1. First and foremost, the president should be consistent in his aims and tasks.

2. An ukase on citizens' property. People must become proprietors. This leads to complete freedom.

3. The leaders of the Center Bloc: Ivan Yuzvishin, Yuriy Bokon, Bayram Salayev, Yusuf Sarzarov.

4. "Execute Twice!" The author? Myself—Vladimir Voronin. Friends assure me that they will make me a present of publication of the book by 12 June.

Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet

1. The president must have the trust and extensive support of the people. It is essential to use all possible channels and means of communication with the population in order to know conclusively what the actual situation is and adopt the appropriate decisions.

The president must pursue an open and honest policy. Without this, there will be no public trust. Under no circumstances stray from the truth, whatever it may be.

The president must be a decided supporter of change, a **reformer**. In order to be able to sail out, particularly with a stone such as we have inherited from the past, we need not to argue about what style of sailing is inappropriate for us on account of our historical choice but to row vigorously, otherwise we will sink.

Under current conditions the president must have the capacity and desire to put into practice the potential of renewal which has already been accumulated. It is impermissible today to endeavor to start everything from scratch.

Whoever is elected president must maintain continuity in policy, which has been collectively shaped at the congresses of people's deputies and sessions of the Russian parliament.

Groundwork for reforms has been performed. Many laws have been enacted. Painstaking, daily work on implementing them is needed.

It is essential that the president be capable of dialogue with various political parties and public movements, but not for dialogue's sake but to champion the interests of Russia and its citizens. I see in the realization of the "round table" an opportunity for the preservation of civil peace and tranquillity in the republic and the country. The more so in that it is already beginning to operate. This means, specifically, the "Nine Plus One" Agreement and others.

I am sure that this is a necessary minimum over and above the set of qualities which should be inherent in any president of any country.

2. This depends on a number of circumstances. On the actual authority with which the president is endowed. On the actual situation at the time of the president's assumption of office. And it is changing quite dynamically.

The president's first decisions will also be influenced by the presidential campaign itself since each candidate will

meet intensively with the electorate, and some emergency measures will possibly be required.

To speak as a whole, I believe that the president's first decisions should not pursue some contrived aims or be adopted for the sake of empty effect. If we are being specific, I would not now like to bind myself by an undertaking to adopt this decision or the other first, not second. Nor is this what is most important.

I can assure you that the preparation of decisions is now under way and that they will be made public each in its own time.

3. Thought is being given to the question of the presidential team. A candidate for the office of vice president has been named. This is Aleksandr Vladimirovich Rutskoy. As far as the team is concerned, if I am elected, it will incorporate fellow thinkers, people with independent views upholding their own position, even if they are in a minority, incapable of meanness.

I would not like to give specific names at this time. It is, as you yourselves understand, a delicate question, come to that. But the team will include well-known scientists and specialists and politicians. There will be new names also, of course.

4. It is hard to answer this question. Considering that everyone has his own favorite books. Nor would I like my opinion to appear as a command. I personally was formerly greatly impressed by M.Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin's book "Story of a Town." It is very instructive for those who are connected with state power in Russia. And astonishingly contemporary.

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union

1. Russians are today the most oppressed nation in the country. For this reason a principal quality of the president should be Russian patriotism. It is this alone that is today capable of performing a mobilizing role and uniting and inspiring our people. I would know how to defend Russians throughout the territory of the USSR.

2. My presidential ukase would be in two parts. I would as of 1 July lower the price of vodka to 7 rubles and the price of other alcoholic beverages also. I would cancel all restrictions on their sale. Currently the entire country is standing in line for two hours a day—this is absurd! With me vodka would be sold everywhere, on each corner around the clock! Part two of the ukase would be the lifting of all restrictions on all forms of economic activity. I would untie the people's hands, for the present economic legislation is prohibitive. Even if there is initially a little anarchy, we would, on the other hand, subsequently acquire a normal economy. No departments for combating embezzlement of socialist property and profiteering and sanitary-epidemiological stations.... For a while. But I would bring down prices in October even. In Moscow meat would cost 5 rubles, and there would be smoking sheds and bakeries everywhere, old women would sell pies on each corner, and the KGB and the militia would protect them against racketeers. A month or two of disarray, some people might somewhere be poisoned even, but by fall life would be normal.

3. My team is already partially formed. Vice president would be Andrey Zavidiya, president of the Goland concern and an economist by education. Minister of agriculture would be Akhmet Khalitov, also a specialist. Silayev could remain premier, I have nothing against Bocharov, Yavlinskiy.... The main thing is specialists, lawyers, and economists taking precedence. I do not aim at replacing everyone, let those who are competent remain! I am prepared to enlist in work even those convicted of crimes of office and economic crimes for the majority of them are, after all, real entrepreneurs.

4. I believe that everyone should read Carnegie's books. Our country has never attached any importance to the personality, and for this reason we do not know how to build the right relations between people, whence the eternal mutual struggle and rejection of another's opinion. I am ready to cooperate with everyone: communists, democrats, conservatives, socialists. This would be my main principle in relations with a future cabinet, deputies, and the electorate. If I am elected, the republic and the country would acquire the first European-educated and intellectual president. After all, the president of Russia is the main candidate for the office of president of the Union, and people should be aware of this.

Roman Kalinin, leader of the Libertarian Party and the Association of Sexual Minorities

1. Conscientiousness. He should be ashamed of behaving unjustly. I believe that the blood in the country's flashpoints is also the result of the ill-considered foreign policy of the present Russian leadership. Connivance is the main negative feature of today's leaders of Russia. The main thing is not to close one's eyes to injustice.

2. On the nonpromulgation of stupid ukases. My election program consists of a comprehensive plan for the recovery of this country's economy. Its essence is that if you wish to fill your belly, give up somewhat more of your national pride. It is time for all to finally understand that a fat and intelligent German running our economy is better than an equally fat but not so intelligent Pavlov. For this reason, all doors are wide open to foreign capital. In the political sphere, the most important thing is to crush as quickly as possible the blood-sucking leech on the body of the people—the CPSU, the KGB, and the Army. But the main purpose of my election program is to restore human rights in this lawless state. Only here do people not have the right to a private life. Socialism simply cripples the fate of thousands of people who by the will of nature have been born different from everyone else. The shameful Article 121 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, which debases human dignity, makes honest love a crime punishable under criminal law. Is this not an infringement of human

rights! All inhabitants of Russia should know that, thanks to this article, one out of every 10 children will automatically be condemned while in its mother's womb even. The bed is not the place for politics, it belongs to me, not the state.

3. Intelligent people.

4. The Gospel and "Dr. Zhivago."

Colonel General Albert Makashov, commander of the Volga-Urals Military District

1. Honesty and decency. An ability to make decisions and assume responsibility for the fate of the fatherland. Also an essential quality, in my view, is a capacity for finishing all that one has begun.

2. On bringing constitutional order to bear in Russia and on the strict observance of legality. I would call on all citizens to render the law enforcement authorities and the organs of justice the utmost assistance. Everyone is fed up with this chaos and orgy of crime. If we complied with the laws, no so-called flashpoints could arise in our country.

What is happening in the southern republics cannot be a matter of indifference for Russia. It, like every power, has its strategic interests. If America is defending its interests thousands of kilometers from its own borders, Russia, I believe, could find the means to restore peace and order in places in direct proximity to itself.

3. I would like to see alongside myself primarily people of a patriotic frame of mind who are devoted to the motherland and their duty. Specialists who are highly competent in economics, but who do not theorize but are familiar with practice, are unfailingly necessary also. Approximately one-third of the presidential team should be made up of women. They, first, are free of such a male vice as drunkenness, second, they possess practical gumption and logic. Margaret Thatcher, a woman whom one could not fail to admire, is an example. I will be able to give the names of my associates and also of the vice president only after registration.

4. I would advise people to read Carnegie. An excellent book. We all lack elementary breeding, a smattering of culture, as one academician said, sociability, tact, mutual tolerance, and an ability to hear other's words and think before responding.

Vyacheslav Potemkin, president of the League of Independent Scientists of the USSR, chairman of the Progressive Party[subhead]

1. It is essential that the president of Russia possess high intellectual qualities and have a systemic approach, only then will he be able to adopt the right decisions. It would be good were he to have his own scientifically substantiated program of renewal, and it would be desirable were he himself to be its principal developer. I have such a program.

2. The first ukase would be on the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR and the Supreme Soviet and the scheduling of new elections in order that there might be in the republic's highest legislative body new people with a desire to share the program I propose. The basis of it is the unitary principle of the national-state arrangement of the republic and the country and the abandonment of national division and a switch to territorial division—oblast or provincial. In our opinion, the republics are superfluous power structures, and sovereignization necessarily means blood and impasse. In the economic sphere our main propositions are the payment of each worker the full value of his manpower, social regulation via taxes, a halt to the movement out of the country of raw material overseas, and indexation of the living standard.

3. The vice president of Russia must necessarily be a representative of the national minorities. The League of Independent Scientists is a ready-made cabinet, of specialists of the highest levels and professionals, what is more.

4. Inasmuch as the cabinet will be composed of highly educated people and intellectuals, it is difficult suggesting to them a book which they will not have read. But a reference work could, possibly, be my book "You Are a God." This is an attempt to understand and explain the essence of human existence and answer the question of what is meant by man, the spirit, the devil, faith, creativity, religion, Russia....

Nikolay Ryzhkov, retiree, people's deputy of the USSR

1. He should be a statesman free of opportunist considerations and a man of firm beliefs and strong will and sincere with the people, who have entrusted to him the leadership of Russia.

2. I am most disturbed currently by the position of the needy strata of the population, the lack of goods on the store shelves, and the growth of crime. The first ukases will evidently concern these problems. Although the very first ukases of any elected president of Russia, I believe, will concern appointments to the government.

3. If I am victorious at the elections, I would like in this difficult period to see in my team highly qualified specialists in various fields of learning. It is immaterial to me to what views this person or the other adheres in respect of our past, what is more is important is that the new government include honest, decent people, patriots of Russia. I would like to have in my team young professionals who look to the future and who offer unique solutions to the accumulated problems.

A principal question today is the manageability of the state. I have been approached by many young executives of enterprises, associations, and concerns. These are well-trained, professional managers. We need to promote the young and capable. As far as actual personalities are concerned, let us wait for the results of the elections.

4. We all read one book—the book of life. Each takes from it what is closer to him, what is more comprehensible, and what he needs at a given time. I am not a supporter of the imposition of some "short courses," some one viewpoint, even if it is contained in a brilliant work of literature or science fiction. Professionals today need to read as much specialized literature in their field as possible, and the ordinary reader, as many books as possible about our great motherland. Such books foster a sense of duty to future generations for what one does today. We are today most in need of a sense of responsibility for our words and for our deeds.

Professor Aleksey Sergeyev, leader of the United Workers Front

1. The main quality, which all Soviet leaders have lacked in the years of perestroyka, is an ability not to play it crafty with the people. To tell the truth—this is my principle.

2. My first ukase would be geared to the introduction of a very important economic measure, which would make it possible for the whole Soviet people to live normally on ordinary wages. I will refrain from giving details as yet, but will say candidly that this measure will not affect the earned savings of honest citizens and will be aimed only against ill-gotten capital. Monetary reform, thanks to which it will be possible to lower prices to the level prior to 2 April, is essential.

3. My cabinet should be headed first and foremost by a good lawyer, and I already have an eye on a candidate. In addition, I believe that a professional military man and a talented organizer of industry who is conversant not only with our culpable experience but also the subtleties of Western production are essential, and I would, of course, need a highly professional leader of health care, who, I hope, would not repeat the mistakes of the previous apologies for ministers.

4. I would recommend to those involved in economics, probably require them even to read the classics of modern Western economics. And compulsorily for everyone—Dale Carnegie.

Lev Ubozhko, chairman of the Conservative Party

1. I believe that strong and decisive personalities who have a capacity for persuasion can lead the republic and the country out of the crisis. The weak can do nothing here. For this reason many people want an iron hand. I understand this. But when the cry goes up that Ubozhko would drown the country in blood if he came to power, this is absurd. I am severe, but right alongside this I am kind and humane.... A military junta, not despots, tyrants, and murderers, comes to power in some states. They say plainly: We will give you time, we will prepare for freedom, then, please, elect a civilian government, we will step aside.

2. I would have three ukases. In the sphere of policy, for disbanding the Supreme Soviet, holding elections, and electing a Russian parliament on a multiparty basis. In the sphere of economics, introducing primarily a market and private property, that which the West has, there is no point us looking for some paths of our own. We have been looking for 70 years, and all is ending in catastrophe, mass killings, and indigence. In spiritual life, complete independence of the press and real freedom of speech.

3. I would invite onto my team Artem Tarasov, but he is in France. I am not opposed to such people as Belozertsev, Kasparov—they are decent and radical—I worship honest and straightforward people. I do not like intriguers. Many prattlers have sprung up in "Democratic Russia," incidentally, and the people are dissatisfied with such democracy. Indeed, it is hard to understand who are better—the democrats or communists.

4. "The Nomenclature" by Voslenskiy, Avtorkhanov's "Techniques of Power," Solzhenitsyn's "GULAG Archipelago," and Shapiro's "The CPSU." I like books that provide knowledge and documentary-journalistic books that teach something. I do not care to read for recreation.

IZVESTIYA Views Candidates' Motives

PM2105133191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Article by Nikolay Andreyev under the "Political Diary" rubric: "All the Contenders' Men"]

[Text] The circle of those anxious to run for the post of president of Russia has narrowed. In their majority they are people known to the country who do not need to be presented at length—V. Bakatin, B. Yeltsin, A. Makashov, N. Ryzhkov. And nonetheless there is some point in discussing what prompted each of them to undertake such a laborious business.

That is simplest of all with B. Yeltsin. Back when the post of president of Russia was established it was clear to everyone that he would be the first candidate and most likely the most probable victor. Claims even crept in that B. Yeltsin was thus clearing his way to dictatorship. A warning of the following kind was also heard from Communists: An attempt is being made to restore the monarchist regime. B. Yeltsin, of course, is inclined toward extravagant actions, but nonetheless not to that extent, and he will not become a dictator either, for that you must at the least have strong support from army circles, which he does not have.

So B. Yeltsin is a candidate for the post of president of Russia and nothing more. He has sufficiently high chances of winning. Although the year he has been in power has been contradictory. There has been no shortage of vigorous statements, serious intentions have been proclaimed, there is a large amount of groundwork in legislative activity, but events in the Union's biggest republic do not seem to be dependent upon the chairman of its Supreme Soviet. Sometimes one has formed the impression that B. Yeltsin and his team lack the creative

strength to overcome political, economic, and social problems. But the lack of power is just as real. Nonetheless the sympathies of a substantial section of Russian society are on B. Yeltsin's side.

To all appearances V. Bakatin has decided to try his luck in a leading role with a large dose of inner conflict. He is one of the few politicians to have emerged from the apparatus who has sober ideas about the real disposition of forces in society. Most likely he spent a long time thinking about who would actually support him. The democratic forces are conducting a campaign in support of B. Yeltsin, the Communists have given their nomenklatura support to N. Ryzhkov, while the men in shoulder boards have supported A. Makashov, but on whom can Bakatin count?

And, finally, the biggest enigma—the motives for N. Ryzhkov's decision to take part in the presidential race. In one interview he stated with his natural modesty that he is not seeking power ("He has never sought it"—added the ex-premier's wife, who was present during the talk. And we can add: But if he does come to power, he will be very reluctant to part with it). However, as N. Ryzhkov explains, two important circumstances forced him to make the decision. The first is presented solemnly: "The country is in a very grave situation. It was probably not like that in the war. At this moment you must try to do everything in your power..." Then N. Ryzhkov specifies why it is he who must shoulder the gigantic burden: "When a hard time comes, the time to decide a difficult question, some people are lost and become nervous. For me the opposite is true, for me mobilization comes immediately." One might agree with that were it not for persistent recollections of the five years when N. Ryzhkov was head of the Soviet Government. And the question arises just as persistently: What prevented N. Ryzhkov from mobilizing himself to take vigorous measures to save the country?

There is no denying that N. Ryzhkov is likeable. A simple, kindly man, a tired gaze, a voice trembling from his experiences—all that is touching. But to what extent are these qualities sufficient to entrust our destiny to him once again?

And the second circumstance which forced N. Ryzhkov to return to the political elements: providing competition for B. Yeltsin. Moreover, you form the impression that N. Ryzhkov's main task in the presidential campaign is to stop B. Yeltsin. In various interviews he turns again and again without or without a pretext to the figure of his rival. We shall cite one of his statements on this score: "Let us suppose that no one competes with the head of the Russian parliament and that he receives a vote of confidence... So, after serious thought, I concluded that I must enter the struggle."

Actually, the situation looks somewhat different: It is the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist party that is entering the struggle against B. Yeltsin. It should be noted that it now has complex relations with society. The Russian Communist Party leaders are annoyed that the people are completely reluctant to recognize it as their defender. Listen to the resentment and bitterness with which A. Melnikov, secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party, speaks of this: "A paradox of our reality: The communist party which comes out for the consolidation of all progressive forces, for the stability of society... and which has become the initiator and guarantor of the development of democracy and the formation of the multiparty system, which not a single ruling party in the world has done, is being ostracized." It is enough to make you despair. That is why "workers, Communists, and nonparty people must realize that the CPSU is their party."...They must! But the workers are displaying a lack of such realization.

But the paradox, I venture to argue with A. Melnikov, lies in something quite different: A party which numbers millions in its ranks does not have an attractive, authoritative figure to nominate as candidate for the post of the republic's president. And although the joint resolution of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission "on participation in the election of the RSFSR president" cites the opinion of citizens, who see in N. Ryzhkov "an experienced economic, political, and state figure" and gives him a vigorous character reference—"N.I. Ryzhkov is known as a man who can defend his ideas in a principled manner and who is a supporter of order and discipline"—all this is the result of poverty of choice. Actually, perhaps the Communist Party figures are pinning their hopes on their party machine. From all corners of Russia reports are coming in of meetings held by party organizations which are "unanimously supporting the candidacy of Comrade Ryzhkov."

Today there is almost nothing to say about the candidates' programs. They all have a selection of general expressions, oaths of loyalty to Russia and the people, promises vigorously and consistently to lead the republic out of the crisis. Most likely the voters will make a choice not between programs (and indeed will anyone read them closely?) but between positions. And they ultimately come down to two positions: the continuation of the struggle for a communist future or the renunciation of this struggle. Perhaps B. Yeltsin alone stands on an openly noncommunist position. He has expressed himself frequently on the subject, sometimes sharply and provocatively. Which, it is true, has not prevented him from taking as his candidate vice president Colonel A. Rutskiy, the leader of the "Communists for democracy" group of Russian people's deputies. Actually, let us note that the expression "Communists for democracy" sounds much the same as "democrats for communism." Which has been noted by the leaders of the RSFSR Communist Party. It was A. Melnikov again who expressed the following wish: "I believe that for the purposes of historical justice we should expel such turncoats from the ranks of the party..."

And so the candidates have been specified and the tasks are clear—the race for the post of president of Russia is

beginning. B. Yeltsin's victory is by no means unconditional. Most likely V. Bakatin and N. Ryzhkov will offer him competition, possibly even serious competition. Actually, it has still not been determined whether there will be elections at all. That should be decided by the Congress of Russian People's Deputies which opens 21 May.

Radio Program Views Candidates

LD2805193191

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1137 GMT on 27 May broadcats a 20-minute "election" program presented by "independent journalist" Igor Demin, who notes that the program has been made in conjunction with the weekly "Khozyain" program. The moderator reviews the contenders for the Russian presidency, starting by reading extracts from a letter received from a teacher who notes that "the most conservative among our people are the veterans and the retirees" and that "their ideal is Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, also a retiree, though of union standing." The letter-writer goes on to voice fears that Ryzhkov is being promoted by the central media. Demin contradicts the teacher's statement, adding "such angry letters as those addressed by some war and labor veterans to retiree Ryzhkov personally I have never seen from anyone. Here is what Semenov—he does not give his first name—who took part in the Great Fatherland War, writes: "Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, having set his mind on saving Russia, is entering the election campaign as a contender. One might be able to regard this fact with a sense of humor, were it not for the myth of the exceptional honesty and respectability of the man. It is high time to rid ourselves of these delusions. Above all, it is a question of elementary conscience—to wreck the economy and then, as though nothing had happened, present himself to the electors and make out as if it had nothing to do with him. Ryzhkov was personally involved in wrecking our production of medicines. He himself gets first-class medical treatment, but ordinary people are deprived of the possibility of getting hold of even the most everyday but nevertheless essential medicines."

Demin reads a letter from a former infantryman who says that everything collapsed during Ryzhkov's premiership—the socialist community, the Warsaw Pact, and the country itself, with every republic wanting to secede. "And along with his cronies he wrecked the country's economy too. There was not such chaos even during the war." Demin next reads extracts from a letter from a retiree who describes Ryzhkov as the bureaucracy's candidate, adding "he is still a sick man and that is not the kind of man Russia needs. This candidacy is a cover for the Communist Party of Russia, which will be in charge if Ryzhkov—God forbid!—collects the necessary number of votes." Demin then adds: "Believe me, these are far from the sharpest words addressed to Nikolay Ivanovich. If you are interested in finding out what the citizens of Russia think of him, I can let you have all our mail and you can read as much as you like. Yet so far he himself has refused even to meet our special correspondent, saying there is a time for everything."

Demin moves on to consider the two contenders bearing the rank of general and describing themselves as independents—Bakatin and Makashov. He presents a recorded interview with USSR People's Deputy Aleksey Minin, who says the idea of a general as president cannot be good for any country. In the case of Bakatin, he says he sees him, like Ryzhkov, as backed by Gorbachev and therefore not offering any policies really independent of the center. Demin says that for the sake of balance he also sought the opinion of a military man, and presents a recorded interview with Colonel-General Kovtunov, a Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) people's deputy from Buryatia, who says: "I do not think we need a military man today for the post of president of the country. Although there are repeated attempts to whip up passions with reports of the military wanting a coup, no, that is not the case. The military does not want a coup. The military wants a united Soviet Union, not one broken up into small states. They want our country to be strong, with a firm defense capacity, and they want a unified armed forces. And another reason I cannot see a military man as president is that the office needs a good knowledge of economics and of politics—both foreign and domestic. And unfortunately the military is not always very strong when it comes to economics."

Kovtunov continues similarly on the importance of economics. Asked his opinion of Bakatin, Kovtunov says he does not know him very well but thinks Ryzhkov outstrips him in political knowledge and standing. Asked how he thinks Bakatin performed at the Interior Ministry, Kovtunov again says it is difficult to say how much importance press reports should be given. He adds that he thinks Yeltsin is clearly the strongest contender, though he himself will be voting for Ryzhkov. Demin replies: "But you are a military man. You could turn up at your unit and literally issue an order for men to vote for Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov. Is it not possible that your fellow officers might do such a thing, say, on behalf of General Makashov?" Kovtunov replies: "I do not think anything is done by issuing orders now. Each person has his opinions, his convictions," adding that each will decide what the different policies offered will mean for him. He concludes: "And I, as a military man, will think of what the army will get out of it."

Demin next presents recorded extracts of a news conference given by Bakatin at the House of Journalists, apologizing for the quality of the recording. The first Bakatin extract runs as follows:

"If one understands the inevitability of a transition period, with its inherent danger of instability, which we are aware of every day, then this conditions the main principle and the main difference from the policies of the present Russian and union leaderships—namely, the principle of accord. But not accord founded on blind trust; rather, accord founded on openness and honesty among those in authority. I am ready to cooperate with

any parties—workers, peasants, or other kinds of movements—though not for the purpose of debunking one kind of dogma or another, or -isms old or new which practically nobody is interested in today; but for the purpose of constructive cooperation, above all in matters of enhancing the efficiency of the economy. The second feature—or the second difference—is a turn from programs which are heaped one on top of another and thus are never actually implemented to orderly action. Order and action. While observing continuity we have to be much more vigorous in putting into practice the statement signed by the nine republics and the union president. We have to move in real terms to a firm economic regime, a regime of firm economies. We talk a lot about this, make many appeals for this but in practical terms do nothing, either at union or at Russian level. Both in the long term and in the immediate term there are two permanent priorities by which we shall be guided. The first is in the sphere of agriculture, and consists in our not pestering the peasants constantly with how much we are helping them but simply giving them the opportunity to work normally, creating an economic mechanism—which, unfortunately, the country still lacks—which would make the increasing of output equally beneficial for the collective, private, and state sectors, giving the land on lease in perpetuity to all who wish it and—this is not less important—know how to work it. I ask you, esteemed journalists gathered here in this room, to realize that this is not just some kind of election stunt but rather a deeply held inner conviction. I consider that the absolute priority of all priorities should be in one direction only—that of educating and training."

Demin cuts to a recorded interview with an elderly women who says she does not know much about any of the candidates, apart from Yeltsin, then goes on to described the hardships of her life. He then presents another extract from the Bakatin news conference. "IZVESTIYA asked the question: The democratic forces are waging a campaign in support of Yeltsin, the communists have put the nomenklatura seal on Ryzhkov, so what does Bakatin have to count on? This is indeed a very serious question, but my answer is a very simple one, serious though the question may be: I count not on those who stand all day long with placards reading 'Put the communists up against the wall!' and not even on those who do everything to prove the charm of poverty in the name of preserving some kind of principle. I count on those people of Russia—undoubtedly a majority—who work, study, raise children, wait in lines, those who are concerned about raw materials, about Russia, how it is now and how it will be in the future."

Demin then notes: "At the press conference it was inevitable that a question would come up about whether Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had been involved in what was going on here." The recording of Bakatin resumes: "As to whether I consulted Gorbachev or not about this step, you must see that it would be naive of me to say 'No, I did not consult him.' Yes, of course I consulted him. And indeed it was not just Gorbachev I consulted but actually hundreds of people, at least. And, as the question implied, I shall also say that I even consulted my wife."

Demin again breaks the recording to introduce a recorded conversation with RSFSR People's Deputy Vladimir Kamchatov, a member of the Democratic Russia coordinating council, who describes Bakatin as a "dark horse" and a strong candidate because he is accompanied by Abdulatipov with his strong party connections. He thinks Bakatin may prove a more popular figure than Ryzhkov.

Demin resumes: "The next question dealt with relations with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. Was it only because of pressure from Gorbachev that Bakatin turned down Yeltsin's offer of the office of vice president?" Bakatin's recorded reply runs: "I do not want to comment on that now, because I consider this touches on, so to speak, personal relations between me and Boris Nikolayevich. I do not want to talk now about when and how the suggestion was made, or by whom, or what my reasons were for turning it down because of pressure—that is nonsense. No such thing happened."

Demin concludes: "Vadim Bakatin is undoubtedly a clever man. But I cannot make out what he is hoping for. For practically the whole of his program has already been made public by Mikhail Sergeyevich. And what do our fellow citizens think on this score? Unfortunately, we cannot broadcast the recording, given the law against insulting the honor and dignity of the president of the USSR."

Editor Comments on Candidates

91UN1579B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 24 May 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Anatoliy Yurkov in the column "The Editor's Opinion": "Around the Ring"]

[Text] **So, we are looking at amateur boxing again, despite the fact that last week they showed us professional boxing on TV. Our fellow countryman became champion of the world in the eighth round, winning the bout by a knockout.**

However, this was an athletic fight in keeping with the laws of a free market: A certain amount for the victory, and no privileges. To be sure, the amount was in dollars.

A political tournament for the title of president of Russia also began in the same week. It has been endowed with the props of a professional political show, but it nonetheless remains amateur. The goal is to secure a medal, in this case, a post. The truth is determined by voting. The tournament itself has been shortened indecently—all told, less than four weeks have been scheduled.

In a country with the distances and the antediluvian communications we have, this amount of time is not

enough to say "Bless you!" to the contender, if a well-wisher hears him sneeze after all from, say, Rostov-on-Don, to say nothing of far-away Uelen on Chukotka.

Indeed, even three rounds of amateur boxing appear preferable to the rapid-move tournament for political leaders of an all-Russian caliber. Or is it that Russia has been so belittled by now that it does not want to allow a respectful attitude toward its own people, who have been given the constitutional title of "voters?"

Only one party wins in this fast-paced struggle—the one that had prior knowledge and prepared for the contest on the sly. The signs are there indicating that professionals were at work here who managed to foist their rules of the game on their confused competitors. At present, the competitors are merely managing to stage reconnaissance in force, without committing the strategic reserve which is the only way to reveal the program of a contender. Instead, a republic of 150 million is being offered a sham patterned after a congress of people's deputies, as if they were the excited public around a ring: Who will do a better job of persuading. Apparently, Russia is not being raped, but it is definitely being seduced. Meanwhile, not only dishonor is at stake, but also an opportunity to survive.

It appears that the amateurishness with which we embarked on perestroyka is getting stronger. The few professionals who know not only who should be defeated, but also how are being quietly removed to the sound of frantic shouting from the dictating rostrums: Faster, faster! So, the winged troika is speeding... from one election to the next, a troika prepared by a handful of nonprofessionals who have taken upon themselves to decide its millennium-old fortunes. This also means our fortune and yours, as well as those of our children and, perhaps, grandchildren.

In a word, three weeks for all fortunes is patently enough. How can we hold the amateurs accountable, given that we ourselves designated them professionals without much thought? How can they be held accountable—it should rather be us.

Who are the gallant knights who will enter the arena, and who are actually laying a claim to the hand of Russia?

The names of the main candidates for the position of president were offered long ago, and in general correctly, by both the "left" and the "right," whereas the second persons on the tickets have confused the calculations of political fortune tellers and even computer programmers. They have also given rise to a multitude of questions, despite revealing to a sufficient degree the tactical and strategic plans of their leaders.

Boris Gromov, a colonel general and the first deputy of the USSR minister of internal affairs, has been named by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov as his vice-presidential candidate. Why has the experienced politician Ryzhkov decided that two people **from the center** are precisely the suitable pair for Russia, which has irrevocably embarked on the path of state sovereignty and a steadfast confrontation with the Union authorities?

As he explains, his calculations are built on the fact that the people are tired of disorder, devastation, and the contempt of authority and the law.

There is no argument: the people are tired of this. However, they are disappointed the most in promises and babbling from the rostrums. Will N. Ryzhkov and B. Gromov be able to put an end to all of this?

A transition to democratic rule in politics is welcomed by all; however, there is little notion of what this is. The notion most frequently uses as a yardstick our yesterday's condition when nobody could utter a word against the System. By now, this 70-year action (it would be more appropriate to call it a counteraction because it was directed against the people) has generated an adequate counterwave (It could not but generate it!). However, time has compressed it, and sent it up within a five-year period; this is why this wave has the features of an uncontrollable element. So far, the nonprofessionals have been unable to understand and accept that any transition to freedom begins with freedom of the individual, and genuine guarantees of his rights. **The failure to ensure personal freedom cannot bring about a free society.** It may bring about either anarchy or a dictatorship, but it will bring about major political speculations in any case.

The myth about the perfidy of the center which allegedly gets fat off the misery of the republics and sets the latter against each other is one such speculation. There is no proof of that. However, the fewer facts there are, the louder the speculation. It appears that N. Ryzhkov and his team had anticipated the main trump card of their primary rivals: Only a resolute and firm, even provocatively firm, leader may oppose the center. Nikolay Ivanovich is not that firm; at any rate, he has never displayed this publicly. This is why the center will, supposedly, walk over Ryzhkov.

However, as far as Boris Gromov is concerned—a colonel general who has taken his troops out of Afghanistan in a risky and, by all predictions, defeated operation—the center will not walk over such a leader. At any rate, the center will be apprehensive about doing so. I believe that this is precisely the argument responsible for this choice by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov.

However, I do not think that voters will fall over themselves to vote for Nikolay Ivanovich given the Gromov guarantee. The sympathies of our weaker half are more important than the gold of shoulder-board authority. Who will have the sympathies of the keepers of family hearths? It appears to me that the stabilizing factor will play a decisive role in this: Polls and letters to the editorial office indicate that a majority of mothers of well-to-do (stable) families sympathize with N. Ryzhkov. (To be sure, it matters in this instance how many such families there are). We may even say that he is a family candidate. This is why the success of this amateur

campaign will hinge on the top of the ticket rather than the vice president. However, as I see it, the choice of N.I. Ryzhkov cannot be considered fortunate—autonomous entities to whom perestroyka has given guarantees of sovereignty may fail to understand it.

Likewise, they may fail to understand the choice of Boris Nikolayevich, and not because Colonel Rutskoy has failed to make general, and not even because so far he has failed to show himself in any way in state pursuits, but rather because a far-reaching political intrigue is very easy to discern behind the choice of Boris Nikolayevich.

Yes, Aleksey Rutskoy is a brave fighter pilot. Yes, he is also an Afghan veteran; he was even a prisoner of dushmans, and subsequently was in the hands of Pakistani intelligence.

However, the people also remember how A. Rutskoy lost his election race to become a USSR people's deputy and to whom. People from the Interregional Group of Deputies snatched a seat in the parliament of the country from him, having made considerable effort to promote their candidate, and to defame A. Rutskoy. They went all out to brand him a henchman of the party apparatus, the oppressor of freedom in Afghanistan, and an executioner of the Afghan people... Everything was used to discredit a Communist and a combat officer, including deceitful fake handbills.

Why does Boris Nikolayevich need a vice-president like this? Perhaps, as a reliable partner in a harsh, uncompromising game, such as took place, for example, at the last Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, when Rutskoy actually split the parliamentary faction of Communists, and thus saved Boris Nikolayevich from possible dismissal?

Or is he needed as a Trojan horse in the ranks of the Communist Party which is leaning to the left in order to split it, and if possible, also destroy it? Will Boris Nikolayevich try to recreate on its debris his own party, capable of becoming a ruling party and knowing what this is about? After all, it has not worked out with a serious political force in the opposition which is capable of claiming power on an equal footing with Communists. Neither the Interregional Group, nor Democratic Russia, nor indefatigable N. Travkin is ready in earnest for the role of political force number one—provided you view the situation professionally.

It appears that counting on Rutskoy is not without a veneer of amateurishness. The first attempt of the parliamentary group organized by him, Communists for Democracy, "to size up" a split did not bring results. An organizational committee set up to turn the new movement into something qualitatively new, was supported fifty- fifty at a recent meeting in Perm, and actually went home empty- handed. This may also be equated with defeat.

Whichever way you look at it, beginning a campaign as vital as the struggle for the position of Russian vice president with the very first defeat among like-minded people in one's own party testifies to having an election platform of an amateurish standard.

However, there is a motive which, as I see it, gives Boris Nikolayevich a 100-point advantage over his political competitors. This motive is the desire to demonstrate his conciliatory, constructive intentions to the Communist Party, the people, the USSR president, and most importantly, the voters.

To show that the signing of an agreement with the USSR president, known as "Nine-Plus-One" is not a mere episode but rather the beginning of a new creative process, albeit contradictory, which exhibits one trend only—toward development and enhancement. Of course, inviting a progressively minded Communist to play the role of vice president of Russia may be the best manifestation of such intentions. Since the leader of Russia, who quit the party demonstratively one year ago, is inviting a Communist to be his deputy, it is a signal that he seeks reconciliation, dialogue, and cooperation with the party, and perhaps even support from it.

If we approach this professionally, this is, once again, an opportunity for Russia, for perestroyka, and for the country, provided that this is not a tactical political trick or a fishing net for catching the votes of communists.

Yet, as I see it, Vadim Bakatin and Ramazan Abdulatipov are the best pair for which I would vote. The choice of Bakatin is a professional choice calculated for many moves ahead. Apparently, Bakatin has set his sights on strategic objectives because only he may claim two presidential terms by virtue of his age—as is known, both N. Ryzhkov and B. Yeltsin are over 60 already.

The five-year wave to which I referred in the beginning of these notes, and which compressed the pent-up energies of 70 years, has carried the froth of interethnic contradictions into our time on its crest. The pink color of the froth is not a reflection of the sunset but rather an admixture of blood spilled due to both negligence and ill will in interethnic conflicts, which sternly sobered us up, and reminded us that all of us are different, even if we are referred to as yet another, Soviet people. It appears that the logic of many decisions of ours will hinge on such relations for a decade to come, especially in multinational Russia. It is unpardonable for a serious politician to underestimate interethnic conflicts. Bakatin, who encountered them firsthand in the line of duty, was perturbed by these blind and malicious elements, but did not lose presence of mind, or his feel for reality. R. Abdulatipov will not lead the troops disarming paramilitary groups, blinded by their rage; he will try to prevent absurd and dangerous national ambitions. However, he will not allow the sovereign rights of the autonomies to be waived. He has already proven that.

However, it appears that Bakatin and Abdulatipov will lose.

We will vegetate and suffer from a lack of professionalism for as long as arguments such as "he will stand up for Russia, he will rebuff the center" sway the sympathies of voters. To be sure, Russia needs to be stood up for, just as well as the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kalmykia...—there is no argument. We will begin to really accomplish perestroyka when an economically sound argument comes to the forefront and begins to determine the sympathies of voters: What guarantee does the leader give to the labor collective that they will be able to use the fruits of their labor in full?

Genuine guarantees of real freedom for the labor collective, rather than the change of signs or the game of resubordination. If the collective is allowed to work and make money freely, there will be an abundance of everything. We have no other sources of welfare. Therefore, if someone takes an actual step towards labor collectives, and everyone sees and appreciates this step, he will gain the sympathy of voters. To be sure, it is not easy to discern and appreciate this step in this minute preelection space. Besides, they prefer not to dwell on guarantees.

Because unprofessionalism holds sway in our life, jumping on short distances and three-round bouts: The main point is to do it fast, and to get a medal.

So, Russia, who are we going to elect?

Tuleyev's Presidential Candidacy Viewed

91UN1579A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 24 May 91 p 1

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA staff correspondent Anatoliy Parshintsev: "Tuleyev—a Chairman or a President?"]

[Text] Kemerovo—**"Tuleyev—a stalking horse of the CPSU?" This is how the leaders of the workers' movement viewed the nomination of Kemerovo Soviet of People's Deputies Chairman Aman Tuleyev as a candidate for president of Russia. They maintain: "These are tricks of the CPSU aimed at stealing votes from Yeltsin!"**

Is this childish naivete or rather a deliberate, thought-out action? I believe it is the latter. After all, people residing in the Kuzbass cannot be unaware of the obvious: Tuleyev spares no effort in the line of duty. While the unscrupulous struggle for power went on with the help of miners, Aman Gumirovich and his aides established business relations with Siberian and other regions of the country which delivered basic foodstuffs to the oblast, even during the periods of harsh strikes. Substantial funds for invalids, veterans, women, and children have been allocated from the skimpy local budget.

Therefore, let us be objective: In our time, when we are sick and tired of political battles, no party could have been able to organize so coordinated a support for a candidate, had the people not had confidence in him. It is not all that simple to collect hundreds of thousands of signatures in support of this contender to the high post within a short period of time. To the retort about "a stalking horse of the CPSU," the people respond: "Thank God, if the party apparatus nominates people such as Tuleyev..."

It is not ruled out that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, one of whose main bets in the election struggle is on the Kuzbass, may suffer a defeat here. However, I do not rule out that many voters will vote against President Tuleyev for one reason only: The oblast needs him.

Ryzhkov Gives Election Address to Soldiers

PM2905110991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel A. Oliynik and Reserve Colonel F. Semyanovskiy: "'I See a Russia Reborn.' Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Presidential Candidate N.I. Ryzhkov Meets with Voters—Troops of the Moscow Garrison"]

[Text] N.I. Ryzhkov held one of his first meetings in the election campaign for the post of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] president, as he promised recently in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, with the troops of the Moscow Garrison and members of officers' and warrant officers' families. It would be no exaggeration to say that RSFSR presidential candidate N. Ryzhkov and Russian vice presidential candidate Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel General B. Gromov spent the whole of 26 May with the servicemen, whom they regard as potential supporters.

In the first half of the day N. Ryzhkov and B. Gromov visited the Guards' M.I. Kalinin Motorized Rifle Taman Division. Before addressing the voters at the soldiers' club and answering questions, the guests familiarized themselves with the life and daily existence of the personnel of this celebrated formation, which has gathered more than 15,000 signatures in support of the contenders. They visited the soldiers' living quarters and sampled the soldiers' cabbage soup in the dining room.

...The main part of N. Ryzhkov's meeting with the troops of the Moscow Garrison and members of officers' and warrant officers' families took place at 1700 hours in the Army Central Sports Club sports hall. The hall, known to many for its sports encounters, was packed.

In his address at the meeting with servicemen N. Ryzhkov did not dodge the many blunt questions concerning his actions as chairman of the country's Council of Ministers and his personal character.

Only specific actions to get Russia out of the crisis, N. Ryzhkov believes, firm implementation of them, balanced decisions, and statesmanship can today ensure political stability, real economic recovery, and the right conditions for every citizen of sovereign Russia to be

able to live a normal life, use his abilities, and satisfy material and moral needs irrespective of nationality, religion or political belief.

Russia must go its own way, relying on the distinctive nature of Soviet history, using all the best elements of it and discarding the bad elements of the past. In my election program, the contender said, I expressed an intention to use the best of national experience—economic, political, cultural, and moral—in exploiting all the achievements of science in order to overcome the crisis and then find the path of stable and dynamic progress in all spheres of society's life.

N.I. Ryzhkov is categorically against the disintegration of the Union and is in favor of the speediest signing of the Union Treaty, orientation toward the social protection of the population, particularly the badly off strata, dedication to a smooth transition to the market, without "shock therapy," and equality of all forms of land management, which must not be something that is bought and sold...

In his speech N. Ryzhkov dwelt in detail on the Armed Forces' problems.

"In my life I have had occasion to spend much time dealing with defense questions, both when I was working at 'Uralmash' and as a CPSU Central Committee secretary and, later, as USSR Council of Ministers chairman," N. Ryzhkov said. "So I have first-hand knowledge of the military's needs and life. The chief conclusion that I derived from past experience is that the Armed Forces are affected by the same ailments as the rest of our society. The development of the Army and Navy is influenced by both foreign political and domestic political and economic factors.

"It is obvious to anyone today that perestroyka found them in a disorganized state, and, to be frank, the entire military machine had gradually gotten bogged down by April 1985. There are grounds for believing that the review of military doctrine and the unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces in 1989-1990 were the first step on the path of thorough military reform. At the same time, significant transformations had begun in the military economy. Conversion has already affected more than 400 defense complex enterprises and 100 civilian plants which used to handle military orders.

"All that is true. Nonetheless, one cannot help noticing that the military reform is behind schedule. What should one be contemplating now first and foremost? What priorities are required? In the candidate's view, they boil down to two provisions, as follows:

First, the strategic situation has substantially changed as far as the country and union republics and the Soviet Armed Forces are concerned. The elimination of the Warsaw Pact military structure has not caused corresponding moves by NATO.

"This," Nikolay Ivanovich continued, "is not fully taken into account in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe either. Indeed, the transition in international relations from balance of power to balance of interests is obviously going to develop more slowly than one would like.

"In this connection it is necessary to decide on the aims, content, and principles of military policy and the effective combat and numerical strength of the Armed Forces that would meet the demands of military doctrine and truly guarantee the protection of interests and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state..

"Second, it is important to see that military policy and the armed forces must develop as one of the most important institutions of state power, ensuring society's safety and stability.

"Those who are whipping up an unbridled anti-army campaign, causing antagonism between the people and the Army and between different categories of servicemen, and are trying to demoralize and neutralize it do not realize what they are doing as they pursue their selfish, antipopular aims.

"I think I am not mistaken when I say that the consequences of the anti-army campaign, which undoubtedly have a political tinge, are already beginning to be felt," the speaker stressed. "We have deserters and draft-dodgers—things that used to be quite untypical of the Soviet Army, the Russian Army. These are alarming signs and my position on this is a very firm one—these abominations are unacceptable.

"We have badly neglected the social sphere. As is known, more than 200,000 servicemen's families lack housing. Servicemen and their families often lead a pitiful existence. They are living in bad conditions. The problem has been aggravated by the arrival of officers from East European countries and Mongolia in need of accommodation. The state programs that have been adopted for the social protection of servicemen are not working. The package of laws (more than 30) on defense questions, prepared by the previous government, has not yet been adopted.

"We have proposed two additional ways of solving servicemen's social problems:

"First, a dramatic increase in housing construction, with the USSR Defense Ministry providing the funds and the manpower, and a reorientation of military capital construction to the social sphere. Second, the extensive utilization of housing construction cooperatives. Provision has also been made for giving free grants to servicemen on pensions for this purpose. Incidentally, the USSR Government also advocated the law on pensions for servicemen, whereby expenditure on pensions nearly doubled (from 2.4 billion rubles [R] to R4 billion)."

It is N. Ryzhkov's profound belief that the Russian Federation's military policy should be conducted within the framework of the unified state policy of the renewed union.

He sees the possibility of an initiative proposing a discussion on concluding within the framework of the Union Treaty military-political agreements among sovereign republics regarding the existing Armed Forces, the defense industry, and budget allocations.

"The historical situation may have changed and the threat of a world military catastrophe may have receded," N. Ryzhkov said in conclusion, "but one must not view surrounding reality through a dense veil of illusions and utopian ideals. The state is not withering away yet, and neither are the Armed Forces, which are such a powerful and essential part of it. They must conform to the demands of the end of the 20th century in all things—in terms of equipment and supplies and competence and organization. The Soviet Armed Forces have a time-tested tradition of unity with the people. It is important that all society's progressive gains—in science, technology, the political sphere, social thought, and human relations—should also be available to the Army. And that, at the same time, the bad influences and problems and ills of our society, which is in a difficult position, should be properly prevented from spreading to the Armed Forces. They must continue to be socially and morally the most healthy part of society."

The meeting was addressed by Col Gen B. Gromov, who is running for vice president of Russia.

Senior Sergeant D. Strokov, student at the Moscow Higher General Military Command School named for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet; Hero of the Soviet Union Retired Lieutenant General A. Potemkin, and seaman G. Kantemirov's mother also spoke. On behalf of the voters they declared their full support for the principles of N. Ryzhkov's election program.

The meeting was attended by USSR people's deputies Colonel General N. Kalinin, commander of the Moscow Military District forces, and Colonel General A. Ovchinnikov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate.

Ryzhkov Interviewed

LD2405231191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2129 GMT 24 May 91

[Interview with Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov by reporter S. Lysenko, in Moscow on 24 May; live or recorded from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Lysenko] Nikolay Ivanovich, your basic electioneering thesis?

[Ryzhkov] My basic electioneering thesis consists of the need to put before our people, Russia, the kind of action plan that would get Russia out of crisis, and so that our great republic, federation, and state can occupy that worthy place it ought to occupy in the Soviet Union. First and foremost, of course, this, entails questions of the socioeconomic development of Russia.

[Lysenko] How do you assess the chances of your opponents?

[Ryzhkov] Obviously, it is difficult to make predictions today. Now there are six candidates, six pairs, who will stand for election. Therefore, I think that they will have different chances, and, of course, there will be different results.

[Lysenko] Do you think you will have a hard fight in front of you?

[Ryzhkov] I think the fight will be extraordinarily hard. But this will give people the chance, all the same, to choose the correct program and, as they say, vote for those, for that pair, they trust.

[Lysenko] Why have you chosen Gromov?

[Ryzhkov] I have chosen Gromov because I think he is one of today's well-known generals. A very respected [avtoritetnyy] person in our country. And, second, I consider that, apart from the fact that he is a professional soldier and, evidently, will pursue a certain direction in social—well, in the state, that is, in Russia—Gromov is a sufficiently intelligent and flexible politician, and in my view he completely corresponds, as they say, to my understanding of the role of vice president.

[Lysenko] You left the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers because of your health. So, your health at the present moment—will it not hinder you from fulfilling your presidential duties, if you are elected?

[Ryzhkov] I vacated the Council of Ministers post because of the Constitution. The point is that by a decision of the last Congress of People's Deputies, the Council of Ministers simply ceased its activity. According to the Constitution, the Council of Ministers no longer exists. Therefore, as they say, I did not resign. Simply, according to the Constitution, a body of state power ceased its existence. But it so happened that I did indeed fall ill during this period. There was a chance coincidence. So, now I feel well.

Makashov Interviewed on Motives of Candidacy

PM2405123391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel General A.M. Makashov by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Bedula; date and place of interview not stated: "A Dignified Life for Russia"]

[Text] [Bedula] Albert Mikhaylovich, your decision to run for Russian president has given rise to a quite varied reaction in society. What motives guided you in taking such an extraordinary step?

[Makashov] Very many people are asking me that question now. Yes, some people are shocked by the fact that a general has resolved to become president. But after all it is not a question of my post, not a question of shoulder boards. I am a Russian and, like the majority of Russians, I feel dissatisfied with the way our gifted, industrious people are living.

[Bedula] I know that you have not yet published your election program. Could you set forth its main theses for our readers?

[Makashov] Of course. A single and undivided RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] within the 1945 borders. The stabilization of the situation and interethnic consensus.

Equal development and existence for forms of ownership: private, labor collective, and state ownership.

The closure of speculative cooperatives and firms.

The restoration of the state right to foreign trade.

The opportunity for the working person to earn money.

Real aid for agriculture. The ending of interference in the affairs of kolkhoz [collective farm] members and peasants by anyone.

Support for national cultures. The creation of favorable conditions for realists, for patriots.

Equal rights for all religions.

The restoration of patriotism, Russian history, the legacy of the Cossacks, and the traditions of all RSFSR peoples.

Among the priority tasks I would put the creation of conditions for the unconditional observance of legality and law and order and confidence among workers in the law enforcement organs. Crime in the republic must be combated not by slogans but by deeds.

[Bedula] The restoration of Russia is inconceivable without an effective economic and social policy. What are your plans in this direction?

[Makashov] Our numerous political and state sages no longer conceive of the economy without the market. Yes, I also believe that the market is a lash urging on producers. But today who is this lash for? Only for the working people. And it will beat them as our people have never been beaten. The "democrats" look at the West with emotion. But we will not have Swedish, Swiss, German, or French capitalism. Our Russian capitalism will be with a terrible and inhuman face.

What the legislative authorities have proposed in recent years and what is being done now is leading the ordinary people toward impoverishment and unemployment and the dealers of the shadow economy toward enrichment. In this situation now the only think left is to shake out the shadow economy. But in our country it is people living on wages, including the military, who are being shaken out.

[Bedula] What do you propose?

[Makashov] For a start stopping the squandering of the people's property abroad by private companies and joint-stock companies and restoring state monopoly of foreign trade. Today it is only the state which should trade with foreign countries, otherwise everything will vanish into the pockets of a new class of Soviet bourgeoisie. And what will the working class get then?

The crucial question is how to ensure production discipline and the fulfillment of deliveries contracts. I believe that all measures are acceptable here, right up to the introduction of an emergency economic situation. Drastic? But otherwise you cannot stop the collapse of the economy.

Economists have now crossed swords in polemics about prices. Their complete liberalization is even proposed. But that is lack of control over prices. And after all if you recall history, in leading the United States out of the crisis of the thirties, Roosevelt asked for emergency powers and established standard prices, right up to coercion [podtyazhki]...

Agriculture is a painful topic. I believe it necessary to create a most-favored status for the countryside. Deliveries of equipment, spare parts, fuel, and construction materials should unfailingly be centralized and planned. Prices for them should be made accessible. Finally, we must guard against the persecution and defamation of kolkhoz members and kolkhozes. No one must interfere in the affairs of the peasants, they themselves will decide how they want to manage economic matters.

[Bedula] All presidential candidates are now setting out in some detail the main avenues of their political activity. And that is understandable—the course of the president and his entourage is determined by their political predilections and allegiance to specific views. Your sociopolitical activity as a USSR people's deputy and member of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee is sufficiently well known. Nonetheless what has enriched your election program on the political plane?

[Makashov] I am in favor of the immediate cessation of anticommunist, antistate, and anti-army hysteria, because today this is the main factor which is destabilizing society. I am in favor of ensuring the responsibility of the mass media for issuing information they know to be false and items which call for the overthrow of the constitutional system and provoke the population to mass disorders.

[Bedula] You position in the relations between the center and the republics?

[Makashov] We must support the sovereignty of Russia as the bulwark of the Union and not its collapse. The

center and the republics are concepts more vast than anyone's personality. The interests of the state are above any vanity. I do not see Russia without the Union or the Union without Russia.

[Bedula] Albert Mikhaylovich, let us imagine that you are president of Russia. Your attitude toward military reform, toward the problems of the Armed Forces' activity?

[Makashov] I am in favor of reform. It will help us purge ourselves and pull ourselves together, some people will shed excess weight, others will stop wearing out their trousers in cosy seats. But the reform should be a well-thought-out step ruling out a reduction of combat readiness and aimed at improving the troops' qualitative makeup.

Right now the army is being enlisted to solve all kinds of secondary tasks. That is pernicious for it. You cannot hold two watermelons in one hand—you can not engage in both combat training and national economic tasks. In that case there should be an alternative service—for work in the national economy.

The Armed Forces must be a single state organism and under a single leadership. Their division according to the republics is inadmissible. Otherwise there will be armed internecine war, bloodletting, human casualties, and the complete collapse of the state. The question of the attitude toward the army is now becoming almost the basic one in the preservation of a single Union. And of course the future Russian president cannot fail to consider that.

I am also concerned by the problem of servicemen's protection. They have come to a pretty pass, as they say. The man in shoulder boards must be protected from insults, from the psychological pressure of those forces which are trying to present the army as almost the chief threat to democracy. For the umpteenth time assurances are being demanded from the army as to who it is with. There can only be one answer here: The army has been, is, and will be on the side of the working people.

[Bedula] There was a report in the mass media recently that the Russian Supreme Soviet intends to make a decision on the departyization of the republic's KGB organs. Will the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the Armed Forces on Russian territory not then be in a similar position?

[Makashov] If the party leaves the KGB, the MVD, and the army, its place will instantly be taken by another ideology. The calls of the dark forces, most often of an antisocialist bent, for the abolition of military-political organs and for departyization are nothing other than an attempt to weaken or negate the CPSU's influence in the Armed Forces and to undermine the foundations of political, military, moral, and legal education. The aim of these actions is to shake and break down the state's last stable institution and thus create the main condition for seizing power in the country.

And if we are speaking in broad terms, then world civilization has not known and does not know any departyized armies. Such assertions are absurd, a trap for simpletons under the fashionable slogan of the democratization of army relations.

[Bedula] I know that the more than 100,000 signatures needed for your registration as a presidential candidate were collected in virtually two days. The Sverdlovsk garrison alone provided over 20,000. But in this case the bulk of the signatories are servicemen. Are you certain, Albert Mikhaylovich, that it is not only the army which will support you at the election?

[Makashov] I did not decide immediately to run for the post of president of Russia. I was given confidence by the appeals from dozens of sociopolitical organizations and associations, by letters and telegrams from hundreds and thousands of ordinary people who have nothing to do with the army.

[Bedula] Then perhaps you already know which social strata of the Russian population are your potential supporters?

[Makashov] Above all I am counting on support from patriotically minded people, from working people, veterans, servicemen—all those to whom our [passage indistinct] from the Don, the Kuban, Stavropol, Terek, the Urals, Siberia, and the Transbaykal has stated its support. And something I had not expected at all—thousands of believers and temperance societies have expressed their agreement to see me as president.

[Bedula] Probably people are asking why they should support you and not the other candidates?

[Makashov] The workers consider me independent and unwavering. The oblast soviet deputies want to support not a corrupt man but an independent military man. The kolkhoz members and veterans want a man who defends their rights uncompromisingly.

[Bedula] As is the custom throughout the world, the presidential candidates are unstinting in their promises to their people...

[Makashov] I do not promise every boon for Russia—either in 500 days or 1,000 days. I promise a constitutional order by legal means in which each person will be obliged to work and not to speculate and to fulfill existing laws and on this basis bread, butter, meat, milk, and consumer goods will appear in the republic. I shall not struggle for the post and title of president but for a united, wealthy Russia worthy of its name, for humane living conditions for its peoples.

PRAVDA Interviews Makashov

PM3005141591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with presidential candidate Colonel General A.M. Makashov, by Lieutenant Colonel A. Bondarenko

under the "Russia Before the Elections" rubric; date and place of interview not stated—first paragraph is introduction: "Albert Makashov: By Birth I Am One of My People"]

[Text] Colonel General A.M. Makashov, the 52-year-old commander of the Volga-Ural military district, has been registered as a candidate for the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] presidency.

[Bondarenko] Albert Mikhaylovich, what made you, a military man, a general, decide to run for Russian president?

[Makashov] Some people are evidently shocked by the fact that a general has taken it into his head to become president. But after all, today we are talking about a rule-of-law state, where a general, like all Soviet citizens, has the right to run for any elective state post, and be elected.

Today I am often asked: As a man who has been in the military all his life, do you know civilian life? I answer: By birth, I am one of my people. We, the military, are not shut off from the world. In the Army everything is as it is in the real economy. And we are no less well-acquainted with economic questions then individual obkom [oblast party committee] secretaries are, for example.

And take world history. I do not think that our generals would be less capable than foreigners. Generals Eisenhower and De Gaulle were presidents of their countries. South Korea and Taiwan got out of their crises with generals as heads of state.

[Bondarenko] Could you briefly tell the newspaper's readers about the main landmarks in your life and career?

[Makashov] I was born in 1938 into the family of a serviceman and a nurse. My parents come from Voronezh Oblast.

I have worn a uniform since the age of 12, when I went into the Voronezh Suvorov Military School, which makes 40 years now. In 1960 I graduated from the Tashkent General Military School with distinction. I graduated with gold medals from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy and the Academy of the General Staff. I have passed through all the stages of service—from platoon commander to commander of district troops.

I am married. I have three children and five grandchildren.

[Bondarenko] Albert Mikhaylovich, you proclaimed the theses of your election platform at the recent Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies. The rebirth of Russia, which you are advocating, is impossible without an effective economic and social policy. What do you intend to undertake if you are elected president?

[Makashov] My principles are to do all I can for society and for the individual, preserving the socialist values of our state without destroying what we already have. The following, for example: turning our whole economic policy toward the interests of people of labor and not the newly emerged entrepreneurs, who make up 4 to 5 percent in our country. I want to work for and serve 95 to 96 percent of the people. To do this, it is necessary to make the working people full masters of production. I would strive to achieve a situation whereby the development in the city and countryside of various forms of ownership—state, collective, and private labor—takes place in equal conditions. I am opposed to the raising and liberalization of prices.

We need to make wide use of world experience in combining planned and market regulation, which is done in Japan, the United States, and Western Europe. We will not have the Swedish, German, or French type of capitalism. Our Russian capitalism would have a terrible, non-human face.

And what is happening in our country today is reducing the ordinary people to poverty and unemployment but enriching the shadow economy's sharp dealers.

[Bondarenko] Your sociopolitical activity as a USSR people's deputy and member of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee is quite well known. What has enriched your election program in the political sphere?

[Makashov] I favor putting an immediate end to anti-communist, antistate, and anti-army hysteria, because this is the main factor for the destabilization of society today. I favor ensuring that mass media bear responsibility for providing deliberately false information and materials calling on people to overthrow the constitutional system and provoking the population to mass disorder. We have a Law on the Press which envisions this kind of responsibility. I advocate the strictest possible implementation of the existing Constitution and laws. Speaking of dictatorship, I favor dictatorship of the law. I do not promise wealth either in 500 or 1,000 days and nights.

The RSFSR must be a republic of workers, peasants, and the creative and working intelligentsia—patriots for their motherland, and not cosmopolitans, parasites, speculators, and rogues.

I cannot see Russia without the Union or the Union without Russia.

[Bondarenko] To what extent do you believe in the reality and attainability of the set aims? Will you give guarantees for improving the people's lives if your program is implemented?

[Makashov] In my speech at the recent Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, I promised the following: "If I do not fulfill my promises in two years, you can crucify me on this platform." I am not going back on these words. I am not a diplomat, I am a soldier. I say what I think. I will not be fighting for the post of president, but for a united and indivisible wealthy Russia...

Bakatin Interviewed on Candidacy

LD2705204891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1700 GMT 27 May 91

[Live studio phone-in featuring RSFSR presidential candidate Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin, hosted by Igor Sergeyevich Fesunenko—from the "Who's Who" program]

[Text] [Fesunenko] Good evening, esteemed comrades! From the titles that have just appeared on your screens you already know that the "Who's Who" program has begun, and you will have gathered the nature and the essence of this new series of "Who's Who". We are going to present the candidates for the presidency of Russia.

First of all, before going into details about what lies ahead in future programs, I will introduce today's guest: Vadim Vikotorovich Bakatin is our first guest in this series, our first candidate, the first, naturally, in alphabetical order, his name begins with the letter B, that's the only reason he is first. And today he is going to be the guest of our program.

Let me explain that as usual for the "Who's Who" programs there are 12 telephone li es in the studio with one and the same number—the number is on your screens, 217 45 43. I can already hear the first call. The first of our girls has started to work and we are waiting for a question for Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin.

In the meantime a couple of words about the series. Bearing in mind the important nature of this event—the election of the president of Russia which will take place on 12 June—Central Television has decided to acquaint you with all the candidates for this lofty post. There are six of them. You have already seen pictures of them. Now I will tell you briefly about the timetable of these programs. The Vremya program gave the timetable on Saturday but a slight correction has to be made to it because of valid reasons. I will read it out to you. You will acquaint yourselves with Comrade Bakatin today. On 31 May it will be Zhirinovskiy. On 3 June it will be Makashov, on 5 June Ryzhkov, on 6 June Yeltsin, on 7 June it will be Tuleyev, and on 10 June there will be a final roundtable discussion to which all candidates are invited.

I should like to make it clear that to begin with it was expected—and this is what was announced in Saturday's Vremya program—that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin would be the guest of the programme on 29 May. He was sent a letter, however, asking that his appearance be postponed because on that day he will be travelling a long way away and Central Television, once again bearing in mind the importance of this campaign, agreed to postpone the meeting with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin to 6 June.

And so you can send us questions—from tomorrow—by telegram or letter for any of the candidates who are of interest to you. And I also want to add that all candidates have been placed in equal conditions. Each program will start at 2000 Moscow time, during a working day, at 2000 Moscow time, I repeat, and it will last until 2100. One hour for each candidate.

Well, now, before starting, asking Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin to answer the questions which have already started coming in, and those which have come in already, I want to ask our producer to show a brief biographical profile of Vadim Viktorovich which has been prepared using Central Electoral Commission data. Run the film, if you would, please. [video: screen shows data, photograph, name Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin] Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin: born 1937 in the town of Kiselevsk, Kemerovo oblast, Russian, member of the CPSU. Graduated from Novosibirsk Engineering Construction Institute of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences. Began working life on the country's construction sites, and since 1973 has been in party work. Member of the CPSU Central Committee. 1988-1990 USSR minister of internal affairs, member of the USSR Presidential Council. Since March this year a member of the USSR Security Council. Married, with two sons.

You have thus been given a brief biographical profile of Vadim Viktorovich, now he will answer your questions. But I want to read out a telegram which was sent to Vadim Viktorovich, but I found out about it before the program and I want to start our program here with this. (Pechenitsyn, Petr Andreyevich), resident in the town of Glazov, addressed the following question to Vadim Viktorovich: Are you—Bakatin—not ashamed to abuse your official position by making use of the state television and radio company to satisfy your own personal interests and pretensions to power over Russia? All the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] presidential candidates, Comrade (Pechenitsyn) from Glazov says, should be offered the same opportunity to appear on union radio and television.

Esteemed (Petr Andreyevich) you have probably already gathered that your reproach against Bakatin and Central Television is unsubstantiated. All the candidates, as I have just mentioned, are offered ideally equal opportunities—they are being given an hour each, then there will be a roundtable with all of them—to present their platforms, the thoughts and ideas they are taking to the elections of the Russian president. Let us end the introductory part of our program with that, and let us start on the answers to the questions.

So, Vadim Viktorovich, you are embarking on that difficult and hard road, the road of struggle for the supreme state office, in the main republic, so to speak, of our country—the main republic in terms of population and the territory, and its economic potential. I should like to say that I have glanced through a whole dossier, all the press, so to speak, relating to your official activity and your biography, but as yet I have not found any briefly, clearly, and definitively-worded document setting forth your election campaign. What do you want to

propose to the Russian Federation citizens during the election campaign, and what will you propose if you are elected? If not the program, you could at least outline in brief the ideas and principles by which you are guided as you embark on this difficult road.

[Bakatin] Of course I can, Igor Sergeyevich, but before starting to outline my program very briefly in that way, or the basic principles, at least, I would like to greet viewers and greet the people of Russia, because although we did perhaps begin on an unpleasant note, nevertheless it is indeed pleasant for me in all sincerity to greet everyone today. I think that the decision of Russians to introduce the post of president in Russia is dictated by the fact that it is essential to strengthen the structure of executive structure. Why? —if the question is asked. First and foremost, no doubt, in order to make the life of the individual, the life of the person in Russia, worthy of the person, if one can put it like that. And no doubt once again here the important thing is not the expectation of certian benefits with which authority ought to be endowing the ordinary person but the creation of the opportunity for him to take his destiny into his own hands. And for this—if I am to talk briefly about the principles which a president, and I as a person who has entered this election struggle in accordance with the law—then I consider that definite principles are simply essential here.

First and foremost it is essential simply to speed up the great work which has been done by the Russian congresses and which has been done by the Russian parliamentarians in the sense of ridding all our political, economic, and other institutions of power of the moribund structures. And then, very important here too, no doubt, is support for the shoots of the new democracy that are coming into being. The most difficult and the most complicated thing toward which the efforts of presidential power, of executive power, will be directed is the reform of the economy, an economy based upon free enterprise and competition between totally different forms of ownership. This, in fact, is a very complicated question. Here, no doubt, we are suffering major defeats precisely because here we have let everything drift. There should not be a regulated market economy here, as we very often loved to say in the past: But there has to be a regulated transition to the new economy, over from our dead, centralized economy to a living economy which alone can provide the resources for resolving social programs worthy of the person of whom I have been talking. But for this it is also very important—and this in fact is where the main difference lies between my own concept and the concept which has been implemented for a long time by the Russian leadership—it is also very important to move over from fruitless confrontation, which was perhaps even necessary at some particular period, to agreement. Agreement is my credo. If you were to ask me to express in one word the essence of my program, I would say agreement.

[Fesunenko] I was intending to ask you that.

[Bakatin] You were? Then perhaps I have given you a little help. Agreement is the basis. But not blind agreement; not agreement based upon some kind of adoration, upon blind trust, that is ruled out.

Agreement has to be based upon sincerity and honesty in policy and power so that people are able to form totally aware judgements about everything, no matter how bitter the truth might be. That is the basic principle. Then there is the continuity of the principles that have been implemented by authority. We should not invent new programs of different kinds. We already have too many of them, a superfluity of them even, anticrisis programs, stabilization programs, other programs, which unfortunately have one common feature that everybody knows about—though there are differences of detail—all of them, without exception, are not being fulfilled. In the final analysis we compile new programs. I consider that we must not invent new programmes. We must not start some new countdown of days, say, following the appearance of the president. We simply have to follow the commonsense logic, the commonsense philosophy of the transition—I say it once again—to a democratic society, to a democratic economy, a free economy and to a free union in the final analysis, relying, I say it once again, on all the decisions that have been taken earlier. Of course I could now say that these programs which have now been worked out, especially [changes thought] I personally consider that there is great potential or that there is great strength in the statement, the joint statement, issued by the nine leaders of republics jointly with USSR President Gorbachev, and the elaboration of the scheme that gives grounds for hoping that we will ultimately get out of the blind alley which we have entered.

But there are, nonetheless, certain disagreements of course. I consider that and foremost one must not waste time pointlessly arguing about the jurisdiction under which enterprises find themselves today—be it upon jurisdiction, republican jurisdiction, or oblast jurisdiction. The important thing is to establish in principle that the enterprise, the producer of goods, is free, in principle. True, there is a certain danger here. You might say to me: What about the monopolies then? It is not easy giving freedom to monopolists. So this process is not that simple. Anti-monopoly legislation has to be adopted. And in the final analysis it is no doubt also important today not to reject the state order, as the Silayev government wants and intends to do, because one cannot escape the realities. Our society is now passing through a period of transition from one condition to another. We simply cannot change in one single moment the accustomed conditions of economic management in which we find ourselves. The important thing is not to reject the state order but to make this state order advantageous. And incidentally that is a very easy thing to do. I know how it can be done. I know that. And many economists know it too, in fact. I also consider that one cannot force through privatization, as we frequently try to do when set certain time-scales for privatiation. Privatization is a natural process. At the same time one cannot say that

privatization boils down exclusively to economic problems, believing that it has to be absolutely on a for-payment basis, in other words that it is only for money that we start buying up shares.

I think in our society, considering we have for more than 70 years been brought up in our social and individual consciousness to think that everything around us is ours and our concept of social justice will most likely be pretty wounded, so this process is very complex and this means most likely that some part should be privatized by means of each citizen, regardless of what contribution he has made to the creation of these basic assets, receiving from the state a guarantee of a definite sum.

There are also a number of other very serious differences which I think can easily be corrected. But if we are to speak of the present moment, and I think this is today more important than disputing about some proceses or other of privatization which will undoubtedly take, well, I think a very, well at least a generation, and the predominant form of owership in our country will be state ownership for a very long time. I do not want here to cite the example of say, Thatcher, who engaged in this process very energetically, and in 11 years only 12 enterprises managed to be privatized in quite different conditions from our country. That is quite understandable.

But if we are talking about the present moment, here we must just think a bit about the moment which has taken shape now, a moment of terrible strain, very difficult moments in which one must already think of the survival of Russia, of the survival of the union as a whole. And so no doubt one should put in first place this rapid liquidation of the social injustice in which very many entire groups, social strata of citizens found themselves after the price rises. To date, I can tell the figure from this screen, even given the scanty compensations, 48 percent of the agreed compensations for the price increases were left unclaimed.

Further, doubtless the questions of food, the questions of energy, questions of transport, what is needed is simply lively administration, very active influence from the executive power. I am talking of this because this is life, in the final count. And if we just move on a little, I have in my programs only two priorities. In our society, which is full of shortages, I think this is quite sufficient:

First, not just asserted but real priority for the countryside. This is very important, because in our country the countryside is today literally economically depressed and if we do not take the necessary meaures here we we will simply lose very badly. Here no doubt, I need not decode this matter especially if I can perhaps...

[Fesunenko] Excuse me interrupting now, are you for private ownership of land or against it? This is what always concerns people very much.

[Bakatin] In principle I am altogether for private ownership because...

[Fesunenko] I mean private ownership...

[Bakatin] I understand, for private ownership without restrictions, including being for private ownership of land. But I think that now disputing, conducting an ideological dispute about which is better, say, indefinite lease with the right of inheritance, or private ownership, is no doubt pointless.

Why? Because society is psychologically unprepared for this. And the Russian law, it seems to me, has found the quite proper scheme of returning 10 years later to permit the sale of land, if we go for that. But other mechanisms are needed here, too, so that any master [khozyain] of the land, whether he work at a collective farm, a state farm, or his own farm, should have at his disposal an economic mechanism that would make the production of agriculture produce advantageous. This does not as yet exist.

But I am talking about the second priority here, you diverted me somewhat there, the second priority is very simple: namely the problem of upbringing, the problem of education. This needs no explanation, I think, for if society loses sight of this issue, then it is quite simply doomed to extinction or to degradation, at the very least, one may put it like that.

And the third and last aspect, because we completely unjustifiably at the moment, among all this fuss and difficulty, have in some degree forgotten what we could earnestly put right. I have in mind the housing problem. I am a builder, I can also imagine how this can be done. It is to no good purpose, probably, that there has been a lessening of attention to this. And there are ways here to make considerable progress on this issue, without referring to any difficulties.

[Fesunenko] Are you not running the risk here of falling into another program, housing-2000 or something like that?

[Bakatin] No, we do not need any programs. What we need today is quite simply to expand the potential of industrial builders, which, incidentally, is in any event much greater than the potential, for instance, of those engaged in civil construction, to sacrifice industrial construction for just a short while—that can be done, not completely, of course—and find an optimum solution, and direct them to housing construction. This is a separate topic, though.

And the last thing is human rights. It is around this, I think, that the whole system of the presidential executive power should revolve, properly speaking. I am rushing here, because I see you have a very large number of questions, and I should not like to hold a monologue here.

[Fesunenko] Vadim Viktorovich, first and foremost I want to say that this hour is yours: You can sit down and talk for the whole hour. But I think it is far more interesting for you and for the television viewers—for whom the program is being broadcast, in the first

place—if there are as many questions as possible posed by television viewers, and as many answers as possible. So according to the rules of mathematics, as short a question as possible, and a short reply and so forth.

[Bakatin] Yes, let's try!

[Fesunenko] Well, the first reply straight away. Serviceman (Sirenov, Vladimir Ivanovich) from Moscow, asks you—it is not a wholly pleasant question, I warn you. An answer, Comrade Bakatin, please: How does your profession of party workers mesh in with the post of minister of internal affairs which you held recently? You did not have the appropriate education for that.

[Bakatin] That question is a very, well, in the first place my profession is not that of a party worker, so how can one ask how it meshes in with my profession? I have a diploma as a construction engineer, I worked for 13 years on construction sites, after which I was sent off on party work. Many people shared a similar destiny, people with agricultural or some other education, engineering or economic education, or education in the humanities, go off on party work.

As to the question of how it meshes in, it is a question of the past. I remember that they did not want to endorse my candidacy in connection with the fact that I have no legal education, but later even rather authoritative and experienced lawyers understood that they can do business with me. Though I do not want to say that later, as they put it, I have taken God by his beard and probably I have not done a lot of work while occupying this post, but at the same time—I feel embarrassed to make some sort of self-advertisement here—the lack of this education did not stand in my way as I have stuck to their principle in my life: Always fall back on professionals and specialists. And an interior minister can not be some narrow specialist, as the Ministry of Internal Affairs represents a very broad range of various specialities, so the questioner worries for nothing, especially since I am not the interior minister any longer.

[Fesunenko] That's clear. But all the same I personally want to ask you a question as the former interior minister. A series of attacks on the customs posts positioned on the borders of the Baltic republics had just taken place. Nevzorov, our colleague from Leningrad, described clearly in an inspired way and with the typical pathos of a writer what happened there and where our side was and where the other side was. It turned out to be that our side, so to speak,—the OMON [special purpose militia detachment]—wiped out Baltic customs officials on the other side, but later—the next day—an interview with Boris Karlovich Pugo, your successor in the post of the interior minister, was published in IZVESTIYA, in which he said that on the whole there was absolutely nothing to prove the OMON's participation in these actions so far and it was necessary to conduct an unbiased investigation, etc. Though it was clear from Nevzorov's report that it was the OMON. This OMON appeared back in your days as the interior minister and it continues to function in Riga now, and its activities have a strict, let us say, nature. What is your attitude to all this, to the OMON and these events?

[Bakatin] The OMON appeared before my time. The OMONs' are everywhere—in Moscow, Ryazan, Riga—wherever you like. It is a different kettle of fish that the Riga OMON, so to speak, stated to serve not the law, but the ideology, you understand. The militia was split according to ideological sympathies: some were in favor of our side, others were in favor of the other side, though there is one law for both sides. In this case it is the law of the republican government in Latvia, which they should serve. I have just heard a Mayak bulletin on the way here—to this program—and Boris Karlovich Pugo admitted that it really was the OMON. In any case I believe that it is illegal and it was approximately a similar scenario to the one we had in Lithuania in January, or a somewhat different scenario to the one in Riga at the same time. no violent actions should be used against lawful structures set up by the legal authority. That is why it is illegal, and, I think, these people must be punished in accordance with the law.

[Fesunenko] And Comrade (Fedorov) from Moscow also asks the following question here: You are known as the person who brought about the downfall of the Minsitry of Internal Affairs system in the Baltic republics. In other words, you were under the thumb of the separatists from the Baltic republics. Can we entrust Russia to you if you strive to get under the thumb of the enemies both of Russia and the Soviet Union? And Comrade (Izmailov) from Vologda asks about the joint operations of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Soviet Army in Baku on 20 January. We all know about these actions and remember them. Will you, perhaps, deal harshly with the Russian people if they suddenly come out against the CPSU or even demand your resignation? If not, why? As you see, your former post is still exerting pressure on you.

[Bakatin] I must say one thing, that both in the post of president, if I become president, and in the post of minister of internal affairs I have served only thing, the law, and nothing but the law. If we are going to talk about who brought down, say, the Ministry of Internal Affairs system of the union there, I think that if such a term can be used—and I do not really agree with it, because the system has not been brought down—but those doing the bringing down were the legislators, because when the parliaments of the republics one after the other started adopting declarations of sovereignty they started to determine the nature of republican power, and everywhere it turned out that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of whichever particular republic—including, incidentally, Russia and the Russian Ministry—was not a union-republican ministry but a republican ministry, which runs counter to the constitution of the USSR. But the minister of internal affairs is under an obligation to carry out both the laws of the republic and the laws of the union as a whole. And the ministry, therefore, fell between the hammer and the anvil.

Of course it would have been possible to make it appear that nothing had happened, that these sovereignty declarations, of Russia and Belorussia and the Ukraine and Lithuania and Latvia and Estonia and so on, had absolutely no significance as far as I was concerned. But I could not act like that because politicians can argue and play at these legislative games, so to speak, but the militia has to work every day and I therefore went along the road in fact of concluding agreements with the republican governments. Such agreements were worked out with Estonia; that agreement has already been concluded.

Incidentally, we also reached agreement on concluding an agreement with Russia, we discussed the basic concepts of this division of functions between the union and the republic with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin; but in principle one has to move toward a situation in which there are repubican ministries in the republics carrying all responsibility for the protection of public order and the fight against crime; but one also has to create a federal structure. So there is no collapse there at all. I think that if the legislators between themselves at the parliamentary level had difficulty in reaching agreement, I can confirm that I always had complete agreement with the ministers of internal affairs from Lithuania, from Estonia, from Georgia, from Yerevan, from Baku, from wherever you like, from Russia: All ministers travelled to see me when it was necessary, and they did everything that was required by the USSR minister.

We had no differences of opinion. So these rumors about a breakdown are exaggerated, I am telling you absolutely straight! As far as Baku goes, here the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet was carried out, insofar as what happened there was essentially a real coup, an overthrow of the legitimate power, and therefore the troops did the job the Supreme Soviet instructed them to do. An investigation of this case has been made, no foul play has been discovered in the case. As for Russia, we have never had problems like these arising.

[Fesunenko] OK. But to finish the part of your biography relating to your stint in the post of minister of internal affairs, you still have to answer, Vadim Viktorovich, a direct question from (Vladimir Ivanovich Yegorov) a retired Ministry of Internal Affair staff member. What was the reason for you being relieved of the post of minister of internal affairs? Was it not because, as you have just said, you had come to a mutual understanding with the republican ministers, and yet the center opted for dismissing you?

[Bakatin] Well, when all these processes that we call the sovereignization of the republics started, in the Baltic republics they were somewhat different in nature. I do not want to say that the Baltic republics proceeded in a legal manner, I do not want to say that there is no nationalism there, I do not want to say that I wholly share, for example, the politics of the Baltic republics, but that is not what the whole thing is about here. The governments that were elected there were elected in accordance with our Soviet laws, they were legal, and as a minister observing the law, I had to cooperate with them. At the same time, the structures of the communist parties—I mean the republican structures—suffered defeat at the elections, they were incapable of commanding the militia to the degree that they did before. A certain number of contradictions arose, a certain number of disagreements, which finally found expression in my dismissal. That is putting it very briefly, without going into it in any more detail.

[Fesunenko] Well I think we would be wrong to stick only to your stint as minister of internal affairs. Your career is a rich one, and we shall hope for an even richer future. There is a whole series of questions here about your mutual relations with other leaders of our country, for instance with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. For instance, (Ilya Semenovich Antonov) from Odintsovo, a sociologist, asks point-blank: Vadim Viktorovich, have you ever said "no" to Gorbachev?

[Bakatin, chuckling] I would have though this had already come out on many occasions through the press and the media, that I have several times said "no" to Gorbachev, on wholly specific matters concerning, for instance, the blockade of Lithuania, or the ban on demonstrations in Moscow on 7 November, or the, let us call it, strange episode connected with the opening of the Russian congress which has just ended [as heard]. I have said "no" to Gorbachev quite often. And I have more than once asserted that Gorbachev accepts such "no's"; in general he is tolerant of people who think differently, otherwise it would not have been worth his while embarking on this perestroyka venture.

For me, Gorbachev's main merit lies precisely in the fact that he moved things from the state of what was called dispiriting like-mindedness to one of permitting the possibility of arguments and differing opinions. And that is after all the only basis on which there can be any forward movement.

[Fesunenko] It seems to me that you have just made a very interesting admission—let us put it that way—about Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and like-mindedness. Because (Igor Vladimirovich Kotov), from Krasnodar, asks the following question, and you have already answered it indirectly: The USSR president has the congress in his pocket, the parliament in his pocket, the television in his pocket, and if you are elected, he will have the president of Russia in his pocket. Can you refute that? You have already refuted it in part.

[Bakatin] There is just one thing I can say. First, it would be of no benefit to the president of the USSR to have the president of Russia in his pocket, as such. And moreover, I do not think Russia will allow this to happen, for him to have the president in his pocket. And second I can assure—well, perhaps assure is not the right wordd—but If simply consider it unworthy both for Russia and for the convictions I hold—for I do have definite opinions—

to be a president in someone's pocket. One can only be a president for the people, not one for another, higher, president.

[Fesunenko] Continuing this theme, your relations with your colleagues, so to speak, in the Russian and union leadership. There is a whole range of questions: for example, (Nazarov) from Moscow, asks what is your attitude to Yeltsin? (Anatoliy Semenovich Melichenko) an engineer and economist from Belgorod was able to get through to us and he asks: What have you to say about Gorbachev's relations with Yeltsin? (Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Elin), a serviceman, asks whether you are not one of those people who are trying to obstruct Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin? And a number of other questions. From Kiev (Mikhaylov) asks: How did Yeltsin displease you by putting forward his candidacy? (Volkov, Vladimir Ivanovich), also from Kiev, asks: Are you a fellow-thinker of Yeltsin's? If the chairman of the Supreme Soviet is not a fellow-thinker of yours, why do you generate confrontation? These are the questions that are arising.

[Bakatin] They are very interesting. From this one might conclude that the job of the president of Russia has already been decided for one person...

[Fesunenko] Reserved for...

[Bakatin] Reserved, as they say, for one person forever and perhaps will even be handed down by inheritance. I believe that there is a law and every citizen of Russia has a complete right to join the struggle for the presidency if he feels that he could be useful to his people in that capacity and useful to Russia. I do not think I know who is blocking whose way here. One might also say that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is blocking my way. If do not therefore agree completely with the way the question was put. In that case it would not just be a question of me, everyone would have to remove their candidacy and elections without alternative candidates would have to be held. Then, supposedly, there would not be any problem. But there were some more interesting questions there. There were questions about my attitude toward Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin and there was questions about my attitude toward Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin and there was a question about my vision of relations between Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. If we have time, I could of course try to answer them.

[Fesunenko] This is a very important issue. If you could be a bit more brief, I think we would be grateful.

[Bakatin] They are very complex issues. First,...

[Fesunenko]...because this confrontation is tearing the country apart.

[Bakatin] Yes, you are right, because it is a confrontation which is, strictly speaking, not absolutely clear. It has some sort of very profound meaning, mostly concerning some kind of personal relations. Why? I want to explain why, because if you look at the overall picture, there is in essence little to separate Gorbachev and Yelstin, in terms of the policies to which they adhere. They are both in favor of democracy. At least, that is what they declare. They both want to switch from what is called the dead, centralized economy to a market economy. Both favor glasnost. Both favor a different union, not a union which is kept in place by force, but a voluntary union in which, strictly speaking, the center serves the republics which have created that union. All this is perfectly clear.

If you take a look at their characters—I don't know, take a closer look—if, say, we have at some time been reproachful and spoken—and I am talking in the positive sense of the word—about populism, meaning the desire to gain some kind of authority among the masses by not making unpopular decisions, Boris Nikolayevich has done it. But has Mikhail Sergeyevich done it? Mikhail Sergeyevich has done the very same thing, in my opinion. He has avoided unpopular decisions and is doing so now, strictly speaking. If we talk about Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's unpredictability which sometimes—he does indeed move slightly to the right or to the left, there is some uncertainty in his policies—can the same be said of Gorbachev? I think it applies just as much to Gorbachev, if only because, thus far, one of the main causes which have brought us to our economic state today is the absence of a clear, precise goal, uncertainty in the economy.

Now, for example, there is an emotional tone in relation to particular groups. In other words, both of them are being blunt with people, as they say. Boris Nikolayevich is capable of saying straight out what he thinks, without a prepared text, so to speak, and on another occasion Mikhail Sergeyevich is capable of frightening the so-called democrats so much that they will not come to their senses for a long time, to put it crudely. So, all this, taking together, somehow makes them slightly similar to each other, but evidently there are some inner, profound factors which lead to a state of permanent confrontation. In this respect, I believe that this stage has passed.

Incidentally, regarding my attitude to Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, I think we have normal relations. I cannot say that...

[Fesunenko, interrupting] You and he, the two of you together?

[Bakatin] I have normal relations with him. At least, that is what I think. I don't know, perhaps he has a different view of them. There have been all sorts of episodes on certain points. I don't even want to talk about them. They are all absolutely trivial. I believe that at least when I was working at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs I was able to reach agreement with him and he understood me perfectly well. I think he understands me now too. I feel that he did a very great deal during that period, with his energetic and even confrontation manner, to break the shell of the structures from which we have to escape.

That is, excuse me, he chipped away at them.

[Bakatin] He was simply hitting out at these structures, to some extent. One can not, however, just keep hitting endlessly. At some point the moment comes for constructive action, when this hitting out, this confrontational approach in the final analysis begins to harm the cause, which, in fact, has happened. On the other hand, of course, I can say that the nine signing the declaration, as I have already said, inspires certain hope. So our relationship is quite all right. And if there has been talk about how it would be with Boris Nikolayevich as Supreme Soviet chairman, I, for example, personally believe that I would be quite able to work with Boris Nikolayevich, if he were Supreme Soviet chairman, if I were to strike it lucky and end up as president. That is what I am counting on, at any rate.

[Fesunenko] Excuse me, I cannot stand to spread gossip, so to speak, or to even to hear it, but all the same, I can not help it, as a journalist. Curiosity is an inalienable quality of our profession, a feature of our profession. There have been rumors that Boris Nikolayevich proposed that you should go on the ticket with him for the post of vice president. Is this just a rumor, or what?

[Bakatin] Not altogether rumors. Why? Because I have already replied to this question, and it is not I who has been spreading rumors. No, it was clearly said that this has already been written about in places as having happened.

[Fesunenko] So, what's it all about, that is why I am asking?

[Bakatin] Yes, it happened, and I telephoned...he sent his authorized representative to me, who asked whether I was agreeable to do this. I said I would think about it, and telephoned Boris Nikolayevich myself. Then on the next day I telephoned Boris Nikolayevich and explained why I could not do this, and I think he understood, really.

[Fesunenko] It is not by chance that I have asked you this, because the fact that Boris Nikolayevich offered this to you, although you refused, is the best proof that your relations really are all right, because such offers are not made to a rival, an opponent, or a person that one feels ill will for.

Now to intimate questions: What is your wife's name and patronymic, and what is her nationality, asks comrade Lazarev, from Moscow.

[Bakatin] Lyudmila Antonovna Bakatina, nee Moiseyeva, she is Russian by nationality, though her grandfather and grandmother were Ukrainian. H[illegible] is Russian.

[Fesunenko] I don't know why the interest in nationality, our country is the only country in the world where, for some reason, there is always such enhanced interest, that is, are you Russian, or if you are Russian, isn't there some percentage of some other blood. Incidentally, what is your attitude to such points in general?

[Bakatin] I am absolutely...I am even ashamed to ask someone what their nationality is, it is simply shameful.

[Fesunenko] The idea of nationality doesn't exist all over the world, the idea of citizenship exists.

[Bakatin] I always, when it has to found out for some reason, I always feel ashamed. My wife's parents, her mother is Ukrainian, from Poltava, and her father is from Kursk Oblast.

[Fesunenko] Miroshnika, Valentina Grigoryevna, a teacher from Leningrad: Vadim Viktorovich, is it true that you are interested in painting, and if so, what impresses you most?

I am not a serious painter, it is simply my hobby. I like to go out into the country sometimes, very rarely it's true, and spend an hour or two doing some landscape oil painting.

[Fesunenko] Just for relaxation?

[Bakatin] Just for psychological relaxation, that's all.

[Fesunenko] So your pictures won't be coming up for auction?

[Bakatin] No, of course not. [laughs] They're not worth anything.

[Fesunenko] A very complicated question. I'm even afraid to bring it up because you will get carried away and start to give a lecture, but try to answer briefly if you can. I just want to extend the geography of our viewers who are asking you questions. Dnepropetrovsk, Petr Ivanovich Zuyev: Do you not realize, Comrade Bakatin, that the policy now being officially conducted—and your policy is in essence no different—means the restoration of capitalism? Why do you not want to consider alternative ways of perestroyka being proposed by the supporters of the socialist line? Why do you not organize a roundtable discussion with supporters of alternative ways, socialist ones?

[Bakatin] The alternative way, the socialist one, we have already tried. We have been going down it for 72 years and if we operate by these two old obsolete instruments, socialism, capitalism, and other such things, then of course, perhaps—excuse me, I have forgotten the name and patronymic of the viewer—he is right.

[Fesunenko] Petr Ivanovich Zuyev, from Dnepropetrovsk.

[Bakatin] Petr Ivanovich Zuyev from Dnepropetrovsk. But I think that is something by which we can measure the scale and nature of socialism. If we put man at the center of the socialist idea—I think Petr Ivanovich Zuyev will agree with this—in the final resort man does not care what forms of property holding prevail here in the economy. What is important to him is how far his own minimum human needs are provided for, how far he is protected as far as the law is concerned, and how far

he is given the chance to develop his own capabilities freely. That is just where we are lacking. Why? Precisely because our economy does not provide the chance to tackle these social tasks and do the social planning that perhaps should be done. A more efficient economy makes society more socialist without rejecting those ideas which are perhaps dear to quite a large proportion of our society. I am thinking first of all of social justice.

[Fesunenko] Here is quite a caustic question. Lyudmila Vladimirovna Kolokol, from Moscow: If not you, then who? Who would you see other then yourself in the post of president of Russia?

[Bakatin] I think any of the candidates can count on being president of Russia, but she knows very well that the favorite is Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. I will at least try not to fall behind him, but that will depend not on me but on the voters.

[Fesunenko] Here are several similar questions which perhaps ought be asked at the end of the program.

[Fesunenko] If you become president of Russia, how will life be for citizens of Russia this year? asks Konstantin Sergeyevich Nikolayev, of Leningrad Oblast. Valeriy Petrovich Pankratov, from Dolgoprudnyy: If you are president of Russia, will you be able to make a definite change for the better in the life of citizens of Russia? We already have leaders who put the blame on the center, alleging that everything is happening because of Pavlov and the center. But what do you think—this is me, Fesunenko, here now—will you put the blame on the center, or will you really work?

[Bakatin] This is precisely the question; I have already mentioned it. If we continue, together with the center, in general in every structure... in principle we have already agreed that we are favor preserving the union, but a different union. We need a single market area, we must precisely define the competence of the union and of the republics and demarcate it. I do not want to go into this topic, these problems. I will say only one thing, namely that Russia in general will bear much greater responsibility than any other republic for the preservation of the Union. And it is the hostility, the confrontation between the government, between the executive power of the center and Russia that leads to the standstill which in the final analysis leading the entire economy—the economy above all—to bankruptcy.

This is why I say that we must move from confrontation to cooperation and advance ahead along the road that in the final analysis will give us a more efficient economy, on the basis of free enterprise. But I repeat, this process must not be resolved by methods of administrative command. This is a natural process which will go on for many long years, let us be clear about that. But even today, if we stop the squabbling, if we stop wasting time and energy on thinking about who is more important, who is better, whose laws are superior, whose laws are inferior, if we stop waging this war of laws and unite our efforts—it is simply essential to do this, because it is the conditions for existence that are at stake. I think we can stabilize the situation, to start with, and then gradually move ahead on the road toward a proper economy, a common-sense economy.

I do not want to give any promises such as, for instance, in a month or two that things will change. That would simply be suicide, well, not suicide, but simply irresponsible. All in all, one must make fewer promises but do more, and then people will see for themselves what is changing and what is not. We have quite simply forgotten about the most elementary basis of government. Before, everything was governed from the center, and now there is simply no government at all. That is why it is necessary to get down to a bit of practical work and tackle the simple, everyday things, perhaps tackling some sorts of plans for the future.

No one, evidently, wants to do that, though. Everyone is busier renaming streets, you understand. I have already referred to this; what difference does it make what a street is called? It can be called this or that, and here we are spending vast amounts of time on all this. It is probably better and more important for the people living on that street for the street to be clean and not neglected. Garbage collections have even stopped, but the disputes over street names are thought to be virtually the most important thing of all. What is probably needed, I repeat, is a policy of common sense, a policy of practical deeds, accord, and then one can hope—and I, incidentally, am convinced, I am quite sure—that nothing has yet been lost.

This is precisely because people work, in the final analysis, this potential is not lost, people can work. All that is needed is to bring everything, as they say, into a single frame of reference, and not engage in quarrels.

[Fesunenko] The army now occupies a large place in our lives—disputes about the army, whether we need a professional army or whatever, why the army is getting involved in interethnic conflicts, is it right or not, and so on. I recall that it was when I was conducting the "Who's Who" program with Marshal Yazov, minister of defense, that the greatest number of questions came in, a total of over 8,000—4,000 before the program began and 4,000 later. Evidently, this is not by chance. This alone goes to show the place occupied by the army in our lives. Several questions have come in for you, as candidate for the president of Russia, on the topic of the army. Nikolay Nikolayevich Sitnikov, from Odintsovo, asks: What sort of relationship do you have with servicemen, and what provisions does your election platform make for servicemen, the servicemen themselves? The second question is from Comrade Kazarchuk, a soldier from Armenia: What is the presidential candidate's attitude to the army, and how long is the army going to participate in interethnic conflicts?

[Bakatin] Well, first of all, the Soviet Army, the armed forces, they should not be involved in interethnic conflicts; that is in general, a principle. We have the internal

troops, and they are today, regrettably, such is life for now, they are involved in these [word indistinct]

[Fesunenko] They are compelled...

[Bakatin] They are compelled to get involved. To begin with, and concerning my relations with the army, let people go to the Dzerzhinskiy division here, near Moscow, and ask; troops can say what relations I had, for instance, with the Dzerzhinskiy division, that is, with the internal troops. I think they are perfectly fine. I have immense respect for these people who carry out their courageous duty in this case, even in the hotspots, who risk their lives and lose their lives in places where perhaps, in fact, the politicians, some of them, have taken a nationalist stand and are starting to set peoples against each other.

I think that in principle we should work toward cutting spending on the military-industrial complex, but cutting it sensibly, not just any way, without thinking. And the structure of spending should change. We should already be thinking about social protection, first and foremost for the officer corps and for noncommissioned officers. Here large expenditures are needed, which can be found from somewhere while there are cuts overall, if, of course, all this is linked to the continuation of a foreign policy which we must conduct, and here there should not be any ill-considered steps. That is to begin with. But in general, in principle, I think that our army... We should go along the road toward a gradual transition to a professional army, and first of all, this could be accomplished easily in matters of these internal troops units which are involved in interethnic conflicts, since it is here that for so long the decisions of the Russian legislators have not been fulfilled. These do not allow the minister of internal affairs to use units stationed on Russia's territory.

Incidentally, all of them have adopted these decisions, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and all the others, and so what can the minister of internal affairs do then, if all the republics have forbidden this? He can do one thing, but this step will cost certain extra budget allocations, and that is to make these operational internal troops units professional ones. For good pay, professional, well-trained forces could carry out this mission of, so to speak, a diaphragm between these conflicting sides, which so far is unavoidable.

[Fesunenko] A very sharp rebuke and criticism for me has arrived. Comrade Losmanova from Moscow, this is written direct for Fesunenko: How dare you—that is, I. For half an hour now you have been selecting partial questions from supporters of Yeltsin in order to put Bakatin in a bad light. Vadim Viktorovich, have you any complaints against me?

[Bakatin] I have no complaint, I would just like to say to this viewer that Igor Sergeyevich is carrying out my request. I asked him specially to ask acute questions. I don't know why she thinks they are from Yeltsin supporters. I think the questions are simply ones which have some critical content, and these are far more useful to me than, let's say, some sort of lightweight questions as to whether I do drawings or not. And so, I have no complaints, I am simply grateful and I think that the sharper the questions, the better.

[Fesunenko] Good. Another woman, Larisa Yevgenevna Shlyakhova from Moscow, asks: What is your attitude to the issue of women in Russia, Vadim Viktorovich? Well, that is somewhat too general a question, what is the issue of women.

[Bakatin] Yes, I understand, she is right, she has put the question quite right. It is a very correct question, since all the men are always getting involved in women's issues, and consider themselves terribly knowledgeable about women's politics.

[Fesunenko] And have greater or lesser success.

[Bakatin] Yes, I was wrong, it is not all men. Men, that is one thing, but I am talking about is politicians. Men get involved in women's issues thinking of women as objects of politics, and they are always emancipating them from something.

[Fesunenko] They do make up half the votes, let us say.

[Bakatin] Yes. No, it's not a matter of votes. They invent a lighter pneumatic drill to make it easier for women to (?come to grips with it), to hammer it in, or such things. There is a need for a fundamental change in the general approach to women's issues. But this depends on women. Personally, if I get the chance to be involved, I think that women should be made not an object, but a subject in politics, so that the women's movement... so that politics is not conducted without women, since politics without women is lopsided, in general, it will always suffer from this male one-sidedness, and then no good can come of it. So women must be actively involved in real political work. But I say again, this depends on them.

In the new society we are entering we simply cannot do without this. It's a very good question (?he asked).

[Fesunenko] What is your attitude to the departyization of all the enterprises and institutions of the army? A question from Yuriy Vladimirovich Kolosov, from Yegorovsk. There is a question from Semen Zadulovich Yaoshov, from Naberezhnyye Chelny: What do you think of the depoliticization of state authority, the army, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and so on? Sergey Igorovich Talanov asks a similar question, and there are more. I won't list you all, comrade viewers, so as not to waste time.

[Bakatin] I regard this as being completely normal.

[Fesunenko] Departyization?

[Bakatin] Yes, departyization and depolitization, although I believe that depolitization is actually a misnomer in the way the question has been asked, since in a

politicized society it is impossible to bring a person up completely cut off from the influence of one party or another. Everyone will probably have some likes or dislikes. Perhaps only the president does not have the right to have these likes or dislikes. But we have to be realists and see what is actually there today.

So gradually, after the abrogation of Article 6, it is not simply a matter of the army, or, let's say, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or some state structures where—incidentally, as far as the political organs in the Ministry of Internal Affairs are concerned, this was my initiative, and the political organs that had been put in there by the Politburo's decision have already been abolished and turned into state structures on the management and educational side. I know the same thing has been done in the army. And as for the existence of party committees in institutions, let's say, or enterprises or whatever, probably as the multiparty system develops we will get to the point of choosing between two things, either accepting having 15 party committees in each place, or agreeing not to have a single party committee there.

But, I repeat, this is a question of time. We are now in a transitional period where the old is giving place to the new, and for this we simply need a certain amount of time. It is naive to believe that the party which people have become used to, and which many workforces have probably become used to, and which has done a lot of good things, can be packed off home overnight, as it were. For that you need to create certain conditions. This process will be a very gradual one.

[Fesunenko] Comrade Rudenko, from Voronezh: Do you enjoy Kremlin privileges? And how do you regard those people who have not refused them?

[Bakatin] Well, what are Kremlin privileges?

[Fesunenko] That would be interesting to know.

[Bakatin] I have already said several times that I consider a privilege the fairly high level of salary I get being in the higher echelons of power. If I tell you now, I know many people will be horrified: I get 1,500 rubles net, for one thing; I have a car, secondly. I refused a dacha...

[Fesunenko, interrupting] You mean a service car?

[Bakatin] A service car, yes. And I use this service car when I need to go from or to work, and perhaps sometimes to go to some other place. I can't deny that.

[Fesunenko] You came here now in your service vehicle?

[Bakatin] Yes, I came in my service vehicle. By trolleybus it is... [changes thought] I'm guilty of that. I refused a state dacha, that is quite right. I refused a bodyguard too. And in fact I don't have any other Kremlin privileges, and I think they are now not at all the same as they were before.

[Fesunenko] Are there special food packages?

[Bakatin] No, there aren't any special packages. You do have the chance to order things along with everyone else, like technical secretaries and typists. On Wednesdays they get a small voucher with which they can order a chicken, let's say, or perhaps ten steaks from the counter at state prices.

[Fesunenko] When your name was put forward for the post of USSR president you withdrew it. What has changed now?, asks Vladimir Yakovlevich Dokimenko, from Moscow. And there are many similar questions. Mikhail Vladlenovich Petrov, from Moscow: How are we to understand your decision to stand for the post of president of Russia when in the past you spoke of your refusal? What has forced you now to take this step?

[Bakatin] Well, I stated my refusal at a time when there was no thought of a president of Russia. That's one thing. And when I was minister of internal affairs and when I was busy day and night—you know, in the original question they said that I didn't work very well, although I don't entirely agree. And now I have quite different work which probably can't be compared with the work of the minister of internal affairs. The work of the president, or the responsibility which the president of Russia takes on himself, is fearfully difficult. As a person who feels keenly and cares about Russia, who feels that there are certain ways, there are certain principles which could move forward a more energetic development of all those principles which I think I won't even be in disagreement about with the Russian parliament, I think that I was simply obliged to take part in this. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people will work it out for themselves.

But to speak of why I refused—for it wasn't only the USSR Presidency that I refused, although that made a splash. I also refused the CPSU Central Committee general secretaryship and deputy general secretaryship, and the leadership of the Russian Communist Party, since I didn't consider these posts...[changes thought] I was not disposed to carry out these jobs.

[Fesunenko] Loads of phone calls and faxes have come in in which people, our viewers, wish you success in your election campaign, and thank you for taking this step. Approval has come from Comrades Dodoyan and Tatarno from Yerevan and a number of others.

[Bakatin] From Yerevan. [laughs]

[Fesunenko] From Yerevan for some reason. There are others from Moscow and other towns. I thank you for taking part in our program. Our time is coming to an end. If you would like to say some good wishes, for example, to your future voters, then go ahead. The cameras are at your service. You have a minute and a half, or two minutes.

[Bakatin] Yes. To begin with, I did not even notice that an hour had gone by. Honestly. An hour has gone by, has it?

[Fesunenko] Yes.

[Bakatin] It seems as if we've just begun, and there is just a sort of dizzy whirl that has brought our meeting to an end. But I don't think that is an end to our meetings, I don't think that in fact this pre-election work, the election campaign, ends with this, although I would not like there to be any battle in it, since the principle is cooperation is cooperation. At any rate, let there be an honest campaign, not a campaign against personalities, but one against programs, and people should be convinced, in fact, about who is who, as your program is called, and make their choice.

I would like to say one thing, that the president of Russia, whoever it may be, should be the president of all Russians; he should not be a president from some party or none, he cannot have any ideological sympathies or ideological antipathies, he cannot be the president only for those who voted for him, and not president for those who did not vote for him. This principle, the principle of accord, the principle of reason, the principle of common sense, of an even-handed attitude to all, is something that I would think any head of executive power, the first president of Russia, must implement.

Personally, if I am given such trust and such an enormous responsibility, I will be guided by precisely this principle. I think that the president can do anything in accordance with the law. The only thing he cannot do is violate the law. And I would like to finish on that note, and simply wish people that, first of all, they should not lose faith in Russia. I recently traveled through (?a rather muddy) Gorkiy and Vladimir Oblasts, and I saw that there is no point in us sometimes panicking too much. People are working, they are sowing, building there, you understand, making fabrics, smelting steel. Russia is standing and will stand; all we need is more accord so that our house is not, as we say, split in two and unable to stand. Unity and accord, and let's go forward. I see no other way.

[Fesunenko] Thank you, Vadim Viktorovich. That is the end of our first "Who's Who" program of the series devoted to the coming election of the president of Russia. May I remind you that the next encounter takes place on 31 May, with Zhirinovskiy; then on 3 June with Makashov; on 5 June with Ryzhkov; on the 6th with Yeltsin; on the 7th with Tuleyev; and the final round-table will be on 10 June. Thank you for taking part, Vadim Viktorovich. I wish you success in the election campaign, and a big thank you to the viewers who have sent in their questions.

Gromov Interviewed on Vice Presidential Candidacy

PM2805095391 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 May 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel General B.V. Gromov, Hero of the Soviet Union, by N. Belan under the rubric "Before the Presidential Elections in Russia"; date and place of interview not stated; first three paragraphs are introduction: "The Sacred Feeling of Duty"]

[Text] I made his acquaintance in Afghanistan—Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov was commander of the 40th Army at the time. I visited headquarters briefly and then spent almost a month touring troop positions, where I really came to know Gromov—from stories told by his subordinates, from regimental commanders, right down to soldiers. People liked him; this was perhaps the first time I had come across a general whose popularity was so universal.

Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel General Gromov also gained prestige and people's respect in the Kiev Military District, which he commanded after Afghanistan. And not only among the military—Boris Vsevolodovich was elected USSR people's deputy, for example. And went he left for Moscow—he was appointed the country's first deputy minister of internal affairs—the district was very sad to see him go, I was told.

And now I met him again to interview him at our readers' request.

[Belan] Boris Vsevolodovich, just a few days ago you were among the contenders for the post of Russian president. And suddenly you made a decision to go for second place, so to speak, and become a candidate for vice president. What is behind this?

[Gromov] First of all, allow me to disagree about the second place. Formally yes, but in practice the role and work of vice president is as important and responsible as that of the head of state. I am gearing myself for the work. As I see it, the greatest importance of the institution of the presidency today lies in helping to fine-tune our national economic mechanism, to strengthen production discipline, and to revive the economy and Russia's spiritual life, because its peoples do not deserve the poverty-stricken existence which they are unfortunately eking out today.

As for my "strange" decision—as I have heard it called—this is neither timidity nor a tactical maneuver, although some people have interpreted it in precisely this way. It is simply that I am a realist and have soberly assessed my chances.

[Belan] You have chosen to team up with N.I. Ryzhkov. Why? After all, judging by the "democratic" mass media, he is the "no-hoper."

[Gromov] Yes, I have noticed the vehemence with which passions are being whipped up around Nikolay Ivanovich. Roman Kalinin's program did not merit even a fraction of the attention people are devoting to Ryzhkov's personality. And yet Kalinin proposed no more and no less than to "first and foremost open the borders and sell off Russia to foreigners..." This criticism is selective, however, and Nikolay Ivanovich's shortcomings are stubbornly being sought. It is reaching the point

of insults, which naturally makes you feel disgusted. And these people call themselves intellectuals.

Why have I teamed up with Ryzhkov? Nikolay Ivanovich is a real intellectual, of whom we have so few left. His decency and courage, and I particularly value these qualities, have already been demonstrated in the fact that every time we have been struck by misfortune—remember, for instance, Chernobyl, or the elimination of the consequences of the earthquake in Armenia—Nikolay Ivanovich was with the people, sharing their grief and pain, leading the salvage work, and making things easier for the victims. People who have forgotten this have an amazingly short memory.

And what about the fact that he took the flak for the situation in the country? He did not evade it or deflect it to other people so that, whatever happened, he would remain in his important post. Do you remember the congresses of USSR people's deputies, and the Union Supreme Soviet sessions? It is all true, he did head the government... And yet some of the people sitting in the hall were equally, and maybe more, responsible for the state of the economy and the insufficiently considered decisions that were adopted at central and local levels. They were sometimes adopted despite being categorically rejected by Nikolay Ivanovich—remember, he was the only Politburo member who voted against the antialcohol campaign and the methods, means, and thoughtlessness that accompanied it. In the same way, on many other issues, Ryzhkov held realistic positions and defended them, but... He did not make decisions alone. It is bad that the people do not know about this, and they are being fed fairy tales: Ryzhkov destroyed the economy, it is being said. That is the first thing.

Second: Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin has enormous experience of party work, he has devoted almost his whole life to it. Whereas Ryzhkov was a factory worker, who devoted a quarter of a century to his plant, and then worked in the State Planning Committee and the country's Council of Ministers. He is a great politician and economic manager, a specialist in the sphere of executive power, he is well known in the world...

[Belan] Did you know Ryzhkov before?

[Gromov] No. I knew him in the same way as everyone else: as head of government.

[Belan] Obviously your views and convictions, and indeed the choice about which you have just spoken, will be easier to understand if we knew something about your life. After all, a man's stance forms as his life unfolds. Please tell us something about yourself.

[Gromov] I was born in November 1943, a few months after my father died at the front. My mother was left with three children, all sons. We lived in Saratov, and my brother has told me about the bombings and the hunger. My mother was at work all the time, and I was brought up by my grandparents. They were cultured, well-educated people—my grandfather graduated from Moscow State University in 1913 and my grandmother graduated from high school, so that they gave me a great deal.

My elder brother, Aleksey, became a serviceman and I followed in his footsteps. First I went to a Suvorov school, then a military school in Leningrad; I served in the Baltic republics, then I went to the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, and then to the North Caucasus. There I advanced from battalion commander to division chief of staff. I was posted to Afghanistan. I spent two and a half years there, and then I trained at the General Staff Academy, then back to Afghanistan—this time for just over one year. I commanded armies in the Belorussian Military District, and then I was posted for the third time to Kabul. I was commander of the 40th Army. I was given the task of bringing our forces home. Then Kiev, Moscow, but you know that.

I have two sons: The elder is 17 and is in the final year of a Suvorov school, and the younger is in the fifth grade. And two daughters came along—my first wife died in an airplane crash in 1985, and my present wife's husband was in the same aircraft. So we joined our lives, since death had taken the lives of people who were dear to us...

[Belan] You are being called a man of duty—civic and military duty. But I hear with increasing frequency that these concepts are as worn out as five-kopeck pieces today...

[Gromov] Well, no, people who talk about "worn out five-kopeck pieces" are those who did not know the feeling of duty before anyway. Or those who want to create this vacuum in our hearts. This is a national quality, the state of the soul of every decent person, and it will scarcely be possible for anyone to remove it from the Russians. I have seen our young men fighting, I have been next to them, and I know how well they work at home. I am not opposed to material interest, I am in favor of these incentives working more actively; but at the same time I do not agree with the idea of the feeling of civic duty dying out. Our people are hard-working and talented and this is one of the main sources of the acute feeling of duty and patriotism. I would say the same about the Belorussians, the Ukrainians, the Kazakhs, the Tajiks... We have lived as one family for so long and we have a great deal in common.

[Belan] And if you became vice president, would you be able to change the state of affairs?

[Gromov] This is a special point in our election platform. Of course I will get seriously and thoroughly involved in this work, trying to help not only the "Afghans" but also the veterans of the Great Patriotic War, those who forged our victory at the rear, and those who performed their international duty at various times. But I want to be understood correctly, I do not want to make irresponsible promises—as soon as you elect me to this important post, changes will take place immediately. But assistance to those who have defended the motherland and performed their military duty and those in

uniform today, and material and moral concern for them should be raised to the status of state policy.

And another sore point—the guys who have been captured and have not yet returned. I have always been concerned with their fate, and continue to be so but using a private procedure, so to speak, through private channels; I have links with people whose names I do not want to reveal—they are helping me in this sphere. But my opportunities are limited; when I was commander of the 40th Army I was able to do more: Literally just before the withdrawal of forces we managed to get four people liberated—a warrant officer and some soldiers. To my mind, a vice president has many opportunities to continue this work.

[Belan] You have had your fair share of attention from the press in recent years. Do you remember, first they put you forward as USSR defense minister, then they practically made you leader of a "military coup." What do you think is the reason for this kind of popularity?

[Gromov] One of the reasons as regards the coup is evidently a desire to defame, cast a shadow, and discredit, perhaps not Gromov personally, but the "Afghans" and people in uniform. People say that they are capable of carrying out a coup, democratic changes in society go against the grain with them, they desire dictatorship. And who is in a position to head them? Of course, the man who was their commander in Afghanistan. You know, every "witch-hunt" shows the degradation of those who are hunting. This is very depressing. What we need today is not confrontation between each other, but civic accord. As for me, I have sworn an oath of allegiance to my people and I have remained loyal to it for 30 years.